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ABSTRACT
TWO ESSAYS ON INVESTOR ATTENTION, INVESTOR SENTIMENT, AND
EARNINGS PRICING
Qiuye Cai
Old Dominion University, 2019
Director: Dr. Kenneth Yung

This dissertation proposes novel direct measures for both firm-level and market-level
investor attention and investor sentiment and provides new empirical evidence on the effects of
investor attention and investor sentiment on earnings pricing.
The first essay proposes novel direct measures for both market-level and firm-level
attention using user activity data from StockTwits.com. To the best of my knowledge, this is the
first direct measure of market-level attention. By measuring market-level and firm-level attention
separately, I am be able to not only distinguish between attention allocated on market level and
firm level but also detach attention from equilibrium outcomes. I document that both market-level
and firm-level attention is lower on non-trading days and days without macro- or micro news
announcements. On earnings announcement days, investors are distracted by higher volume of
concurrent competing earnings announcements or macro-news announcements. Investors pay less
attention to earnings announced on Friday. Firm-level attention is negatively associated with
market-level attention, suggesting that investors allocate their limited attention strategically
between market-level and firm-level. I find that investors pay more attention to earnings news
announced on days with important macro-news announcements, suggesting that firm-level
attention is strengthened rather than weakened with concurrent market-level information shocks.
I find that investors have more muted initial reactions to earnings announcements if they pay more
attention to board market. On the other hand, higher firm-level investor attention and concurrent

important macro-news enhances the immediate price reaction to a firm’s earnings surprise and
alleviates the post-announcement drift (PEAD). I also find that drift occurs much later than
documented in the prior literature.
The second essay develops direct measures for both market-level and firm-level sentiment
using sentiment scores data from StockTwits.com. I examine both the impact of sentiment and the
joint effect of sentiment and attention on earnings pricing. To the best of my knowledge, this is
the first research about the joint effect of sentiment and attention on earnings pricing. I find that
good news is actually punished when sentiment is bullish but bad news is punished significantly
more when sentiment is bearish. Good news is rewarded the most when sentiment is bearish. The
findings suggest that investors do not overreact to good news when sentiment is bullish but
overreact to bad news when sentiment is bearish. I document that both firm-level and market-level
sentiment are negatively associated with the immediate price reaction to earnings news. For the
immediate response, I find that the immediate price reaction to earnings news is weaker when
sentiment is bullish. For the drift, I find that the post-announcement drift is stronger following
bullish sentiment. Taking into account investor attention, I find that good news is rewarded more
with high attention when sentiment is either bullish or bearish, whereas the effect of attention is
more pronounced when sentiment is bearish. Bad news is considerably punished with high
attention when sentiment is bearish. The immediate price reaction is strengthened with high
attention when sentiment is either bullish or bearish, whereas the effect of attention is more
pronounced when sentiment is bearish. For the drift, I find that the post-announcement drift is
weaker with high attention following bullish sentiment. It is worth noting that good news with
bearish sentiment and high attention has both stronger immediate response and post-announcement
drift.
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INTRODUCTION
A large body of literature suggests that investors underreact to earnings announcements
and such inattention causes the earnings momentum (Ball and Brown (1968); Bernard and Thomas
(1989); DellaVigna and Pollet (2009); Hirshleifer, Lim and Teoh (2009 )). Prior literature also
suggests that the attention that investors allocate to stocks not only varies in cross-section, but also
over time. Hirshleifer, Lim and Teoh (2009) assume that investors are distracted by concurrent
earnings announcements of other firms. Peng and Xiong (2006) develop a conceptual framework
of category-learning behavior and contend that investors have priority of processing market- and
sector-wide information over firm-specific information because market shocks affect more stocks
than firm-specific shocks. Recent studies (Chen, Jiang and Zhu (2018); Sheng (2019 )) find that
earnings announcements with concurrent macroeconomic news announcements actually have
significantly stronger immediate market response and weaker PEAD, which differs from the
prediction of category-learning theory, however, they do not find evidence that firm-level attention
is higher on days with important market information shocks. DellaVigna and Pollet (2009) assume
investor attention is low on Fridays as investors are distracted by other life activities just before
the weekend. Hong and Yu (2009) posit that investors are less attentive during the summer
vacation and they find that both stock return and stock turnover is lower during the summer.
There is limited prior research on the influence of investor sentiment on earnings pricing
and mixed evidence is usually presented. Mian and Sankaraguruswamy (2012) find that the stock
price sensitivity to good (bad) earnings news is higher during high (low) sentiment periods than
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during periods of low (high) sentiment. The result indicates that investors overreact (underreact)
to good earnings news and underreact (overreact) to bad news during bullish (bearish) times.
However, Livnat and Petrovits (2009) document that the price reaction is greater to extremely
good (bad) earnings news during low (high) sentiment periods. For the drift, Mian and
Sankaraguruswamy (2012) find that the upward drift for good news is stronger following high
sentiment and Livnat and Petrovits (2009) find the drift for good news is greater following low
sentiment.
In the first essay, I propose direct measures for market-level and firm-level attention
separately. I first examine the temporal allocation of both market-level and firm-level investor
attention. I find that both market-level and firm-level attention is lower on non-trading days and
days without macro- or micro news announcements. Consistent with DellaVigna and Pollet (2009),
I document that market-level and firm-level attention is lower on Friday. Differs from Hong and
Yu (2009) and Liu and Peng (2015), I do not find evidence that investor attention is lower in
summer.
Then I explore what determines the allocation of attention on earnings announcement days.
Consistent with Hirshleifer, Lim and Teoh (2009), I find that investors are distracted by high
volume of concurrent competing news, both market-level and firm-specific. Firm-level attention
is negatively associated with market-level attention, suggesting that investors allocate their limited
attention strategically between market-level and firm-level. I also find that investors pay more
attention to earnings announced on days with important macro news, suggesting that firm-level
attention is strengthened rather than weakened with concurrent market-level information shocks,
which differs from existing theories (Peng and Xiong (2006 )).
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I further examine the impact of investor attention on earnings pricing. I find that marketlevel and firm-level attention have different effects on earnings pricing. Investors allocate their
limited attention accordingly between market-level and firm-level therefore investors have more
muted initial reactions to earnings announcements if they pay more attention to board market. On
the other hand, higher firm-level investor attention and concurrent important macro-news enhances
the immediate price reaction to a firm’s earnings surprise and alleviates the post-announcement
drift (PEAD). I also find that drift occurs much later than documented in the prior literature.
Furthermore, I test the impact of attention on trading activities and find a strong concurrent
correlation between firm-level attention and trading volume response. But I also find that marketlevel attention is positively associated with trading volume, thus, using trading volume as a proxy
of attention may conflate the different effects of market-level and firm-level attention on earnings
pricing.
In the second essay, I propose direct measures for market-level sentiment and firm-level
sentiment. I first explore the determinants on firm-level sentiment on earnings announcement days.
I find that firm-level sentiment is positively related to market-level sentiment and negatively
associated with firm-level attention, i.e., bullish sentiment is moderated by attention.
Then, I explore the impact of firm-level sentiment on earnings pricing. I find that good
news is actually punished when sentiment is bullish but bad news is punished significantly more
when sentiment is bearish. Good news is rewarded the most when sentiment is bearish. The
findings suggest that investors do not overreact to good news when sentiment is bullish but
overreact to bad news when sentiment is bearish. I document that both firm-level and market-level
sentiment are negatively associated with the immediate price reaction to earnings news, i.e., the
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more bullish sentiment is, the weaker is the immediate price reaction to earnings news. For the
drift, I find that drift is stronger following bullish sentiment.
Last, I examine the joint effect of sentiment and attention on earnings pricing. I find that
good news is rewarded more with high attention when sentiment is either bullish or bearish,
whereas the effect of attention is more pronounced when sentiment is bearish. Bad news is
considerably punished with high attention when sentiment is bearish. The immediate price reaction
is strengthened with high attention when sentiment is either bullish or bearish, whereas the effect
of attention is more pronounced when sentiment is bearish. For the drift, I find that the postannouncement drift is weaker with high attention following bullish sentiment. It is worth noting
that good news with bearish sentiment and high attention has both stronger immediate response
and post-announcement drift.
This dissertation proposes promising big-data-based direct measures for both market-level
and firm-level attention and sentiment. This dissertation not only confirms the key assumptions
made by prior research but also offers new evidence on the impact of attention and sentiment on
earnings pricing. First, this research provides direct evidence that firm-level attention is
strengthened rather than weakened with concurrent market-level information shocks. Second, this
study also offers new evidence about the determinants of attention allocation and the different
effects of market-level and firm-level attention on investor reactions to earnings announcements.
Third, this paper provides direct evidence that both firm-level and market-level sentiment are
negatively associated with the immediate price reaction to earnings news. In particular, this study
extends the evolving literature which studies the influence of investor behavior and belief on assets
(mis)pricing by connecting the sentiment-related (mis)pricing of earnings to the attention-related
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(mis)pricing of earnings. It shows that investor attention and sentiment do jointly affect the source
of excess returns documented in the prior earnings-based market anomaly literature.
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MARKET-LEVEL ATTENTION, FIRM-LEVEL ATTENTION, MACRO
NEWS, AND EARNINGS PRICING
INTRODUCTION
A number of studies investigate the impact of investor attention on the stock market but
the empirical challenge is the lack of direct measures of investor attention. Widely used indirect
measures include equilibrium outcomes such as abnormal return and abnormal trading volume
(Barber and Odean (2008); Hou, Xiong and Peng (2009); Huang, Huang and Lin (2018); Loh
(2010 )), and proxies for exposure rate such as advertising expense (Chemmanur and Yan (2009);
Lou (2014 )), price limits (Seasholes and Wu (2007 )), and media coverage (Barber and Odean
(2008); deHaan, Shevlin and Thornock (2015); Peress and Schmidt (2018 )). However, as
suggested by Da, Engelberg and Gao (2011), using equilibrium outcomes as proxies of attention
may conflate attention and information because they are functions of economic factors in addition
to investor attention. On the other hand, appearing in the banner headline or ranking the first place
in a best-performing stock list does not guarantee increased investor attention. Huberman and
Regev (2001) and Cohen and Frazzini (2008) show that investors often cannot effectively process
the huge amount of information delivered by the media.
It was only recently that the availability of big data from online systems provided the
possibility for employing a large-scale investigation of investor attention in financial markets. The
high frequency of generation and the low cost of acquisition make big data an important source of
real time estimation in the decision-making process of economic agents. It represents an interesting
intersection of finance and technology. The most widely used direct measure of investor attention
is Google Search Volume Index (SVI) which capturing investors’ information demanding activity
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(Da, Engelberg and Gao (2011); deHaan, Shevlin and Thornock (2015); Drake, Roulstone and
Thornock (2012); Yung and Nafar (2017 )). 1
In this paper, I propose novel direct measures for both market-level and firm-level investor
attention based upon the source of proprietary data from StockTwits. StockTwits, founded in 2008,
is a social media communications platform where market participants come to share real time
insights and ideas. As of July 2016, StockTwits attracts more than 1.5 million monthly active users,
most of them are young professionals, 60% of its users under 44. 2 The ever-growing users on
StockTwits are active and involved. StockTwits users post about 220 messages a minute during
the trading day and spend an average of 51 minutes a day on StockTwits’ website. 3
StcokTwits has granted me access to their firehose for research purposes. 4 I pick
StockTwits as my real-world laboratory because it provides an ideal setting of measuring investor
attention for several reasons. First, it is a Twitter-like micro-blogging platform but is more userfriendly for investors. It is much easier for investors to find the right tweets on StockTwits. On
Twitter, only a small fraction of tweets matters to stock-related issue. As re-tweeting is not an
accurate proxy for news value therefore important news in finance can happen without anyone
retweeting or liking it. This makes investors difficult to identify the relevant news on Twitter.
Second, StockTwits is an investor community specifically dedicated to discussing investment
related topics. Therefore, my results are based on observations of actual active market participants
who engage in investing activities on an ongoing basis, better reflecting “investor attention” than

Google queries are considered in this paper as big data since it offers insight about the interest of investors in the
searched topic.
2
https://techcrunch.com/2016/07/06/stocktwits-raises-funding-gets-new-ceo/
3
https://xconomy.com/san-diego/2017/01/24/new-stocktwits-ceo-looks-to-expand-share-of-investor-community/
4
I would like to thank StockTwits for their generous support and provision of proprietary data for use in this
research.
1
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aggregated Google searches with unknown demography. Third, StockTwits is the inventor of
“cash tag”. The cashtagging makes it easier for investors to identify the tweets on individual stocks
in real time with no misclassification. 5 Therefore StockTwits reflects a more ticker-like live
conversation. Fourth, StockTwits public timeline accurately captures the up to date development
of market conversation. The time stamp of each tweet makes it easier to connect investor reactions
to market events, containing more temporal information with higher resolutions than weekly
aggregated Google search volumes.
By measuring market-level and firm-level attention separately, I am be able to not only
distinguish between attention allocated on market level and firm level but also detach attention
from equilibrium outcomes. I first examine the temporal allocation of both market-level and firmlevel investor attention. I find that both market-level and firm-level attention is lower on nontrading days and days without macro- or micro news announcements. Consistent with DellaVigna
and Pollet (2009), I document that market-level and firm-level attention is lower on Friday. Differs
from Hong and Yu (2009) and Liu and Peng (2015), I do not find evidence that investor attention
is lower in summer.
Then I explore what determines the allocation of attention on earnings announcement days.
Consistent with Hirshleifer, Lim and Teoh (2009), I find that investors are distracted by high
volume of concurrent competing news, both market-level and firm-specific. Firm-level attention
is negatively associated with market-level attention, suggesting that investors allocate their limited
attention strategically between market-level and firm-level. I also find that investors pay more
attention to earnings announced on days with important macro news, suggesting that firm-level

Cashtags help alleviate the misclassification problem associated to Google searches. Ambiguity happens when users
use non-standard format (e.g. common word ticker) in Google searches.

5
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attention is strengthened rather than weakened with concurrent market-level information shocks,
which differs from existing theories (Peng and Xiong (2006 )).
I further examine the impact of investor attention on earnings pricing. I find that marketlevel and firm-level attention have different effects on earnings pricing. Investors allocate their
limited attention accordingly between market-level and firm-level therefore investors have more
muted initial reactions to earnings announcements if they pay more attention to board market. On
the other hand, higher firm-level investor attention and concurrent important macro-news enhances
the immediate price reaction to a firm’s earnings surprise and alleviates the post-announcement
drift (PEAD). I also find that drift occurs much later than documented in the prior literature.
Furthermore, I test the impact of attention on trading activities and find a strong concurrent
correlation between firm-level attention and trading volume response. But I also find that marketlevel attention is positively associated with trading volume, thus, using trading volume as a proxy
of attention may conflate the different effects of market-level and firm-level attention on earnings
pricing.
This paper contributes to the literature on investor attention on several aspects. First, this
paper proposes promising big-data-based direct measures for both market-level and firm-level
attention and provides direct evidence that firm-level attention is strengthened rather than
weakened with concurrent market-level information shocks. Second, this paper not only confirms
the key assumptions made by prior research but also offers new evidence about the determinants
of attention allocation. Third, this study extends the line of research by providing direct evidence
of the different effects of market-level and firm-level attention on investor reactions to earnings
announcements.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
Investor (in)attention and earnings pricing
Earnings announcements, perhaps the most important regular disclosure a firm makes, are
natural attention-grabbing events. Traditional asset pricing models typically assume that all
investors are attentive and receive the price relevant information immediately and undertake
trading actions instantly. However, investors have limited attention and such limited attention
leads to underreaction to earnings announcements (price is too low after positive earnings surprise
and too high after negative surprise) (Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003 )). Such inattention-driven
underreaction is not the same as the conservatism bias-driven underreaction in Barberis, Shleifer
and Vishny (1998) because limited attention is not a behavioral bias (Hou, Xiong and Peng
(2009 )). Ball and Brown (1968) first document the post-earnings price drifts, known as PEAD
(post-earnings announcement drift) or earnings momentum. They find that prices continue to drift
in the direction of the earnings news over a period after the announcement. A large body of
literature suggests that investor (in)attention affects the pricing of earnings and causes the drift.
Bernard and Thomas (1989) show that investors underreact to earnings announcements and an
implementable trading strategy based on earnings momentum (i.e., longing stocks in the top decile
of earnings surprise and shorting stocks in the bottom decile) generates an 18% annualized return,
during the quarter following the announcement. Hirshleifer, Lim and Teoh (2009) and DellaVigna
and Pollet (2009) both document that investor inattention is associated with lower immediate price
reactions and higher post announcement price drifts to firms’ earnings announcements. Aboody,
Lehavy and Trueman (2009) find that stocks with stronger investor attention experience a
significant positive return just before their earnings announcements and an immediately following
significant negative return. Hou, Xiong and Peng (2009) argue that investor attention is associated
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with weaker earnings momentum but stronger price momentum. Curtis (2014) support that
investor attention observed in social media activity affects the (mis)pricing of earnings
announcements. Huang, Huang and Lin (2018) find that stock returns are less sensitive to earnings
surprises on investor inattentive days. Ben-Rephael, Da and Israelsen (2017) find that the post
announcement price drifts are driven by announcements with institutional investor inattention.
Chapman (2018) find that attention, returns and trading volume are higher on earnings notification
days but are lower on the following earnings announcement days, consisting with notifications
attenuating investor attention around the earnings announcements.
Attention allocation and concurrent competing information shocks
Hirshleifer, Lim and Teoh (2009) assume that investors are distracted by concurrent
earnings announcements of other firms. As a result, earnings news made on a high-news day (a
large number of firms announce earnings on the same day) receive lower immediate price reaction
and are associated with higher PEAD. They discover that the number of announcements is lowest
on Fridays thus the earnings announced on Fridays will receive higher attention according to the
distracting hypothesis. In contrast, DellaVigna and Pollet (2009) argue that investors likely pay
less attention to earnings announcements on Fridays as they are distracted by out-of-market
activities just before the weekend. Hirshleifer, Lim and Teoh (2009) imply that investors allocate
equal amount of attention to the stock market on every trading day. However, according to
Kahneman (1973), attention allocation is related to the amount of stimulus. Attention can be
deliberately allocated when there is an onset of stimulus and salient events (Yantis (1998 )).
Consequently, how investors allocate the total attention between the concurrent competing
information shocks becomes the key question of interest. It is worth emphasizing that concurrent
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competing information shocks include not only concurrent firm-specific announcements but also
market-wide events.
Peng (2005) predicts that when facing information shocks investors actively increase
attention and optimally allocate their attention to minimize their wealth uncertainty. When
uncertainty becomes large, investors may shift more attention from firm-specific to common
factors. Peng and Xiong (2006) develop a conceptual framework of category-learning behavior
and contend that limited attention leads to naturally selective processing between market and firmspecific shocks. Investors have priority of processing market- and sector-wide information over
firm-specific information because market shocks affect more stocks than firm-specific shocks. In
consistency with Peng and Xiong (2006), Liu and Peng (2015) find that the macro-news
announcements attenuate the attention to earnings announcements and investors give priority to
processing systematic information, suggesting there is a ceiling on investor attention. Huang,
Huang and Lin (2018) assume that when investors pay less attention to stock market, they
disproportionately reduce more attention allocated to firm-specific shocks than that allocated to
market shocks. The authors use large jackpot as an exogenous shock distracting investor from
market and trading activities and they find that the stock returns co-move more with the market on
large jackpot days and they also find that the market response to earnings surprises is weaker on
large jackpot days. Hence, Peng (2005), Peng and Xiong (2006), Liu and Peng (2015) and Huang,
Huang and Lin (2018) implicitly imply a substitute relationship between market-wide shocks and
firm-specific shocks. However, other authors propose a complementary relationship between the
market news and firm-level news. Chen, Jiang and Zhu (2018) provide evidence that consistent
with category-learning behavior, investors allocate more attention to macroeconomic news than to
firm-level news. Investors pay less attention to firms’ earnings announcements on days with
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important macroeconomic news than on other days. But they argue that macroeconomic news
attracts investor attention to the overall market therefore the total attention allocated to earnings
news and macroeconomic news is higher on days with macroeconomic news announcements. They
find that earnings announcements with concurrent macroeconomic news announcements actually
have significantly stronger immediate market response and weaker PEAD. Similarly, Sheng (2019)
find that the immediate price response to earnings announcements with concurrent macro-news is
17% stronger and the PEAD is 71% weaker. Sheng (2019) also show that institutional investor
attention is higher but retail investor attention is lower on days with macroeconomic news
announcements. In this paper I extend the existing literature and use direct measures for both
market-level and firm-level investor attention to explore how investors allocate attention between
these concurrent and competing information shocks, i.e., between concurrent competing earnings
announcements and between earnings announcements (firm-specific news) and macroeconomic
news.
Temporal allocation of investor attention
The attention that investors allocate to stocks not only varies in cross-section, but also over
time. Attention is a scarce cognitive resource (Kahneman (1973 )) and it could not be truer in the
information age. The limited attention is a necessary consequence of scarcity in cognition and
abundance in information. With limited capacity, attention must be selective both spatially and
temporally (Kahneman (1973 )). Therefore, how investors allocate their limited attention
temporally becomes a question of interest. Prior studies posit that investor attention varies over
time. DellaVigna and Pollet (2009) assume investor attention is low on Fridays as investors are
distracted by other life activities just before the weekend. They attribute the lower price reactions
on Fridays to lower investor attention. However, Michaely, Rubin and Vedrashko (2016) argue
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that investor inattention on Fridays is an outcome of selection bias, firms announcing earnings on
Fridays have unobserved characteristics and also experience weaker market reaction on any
weekday. deHaan, Shevlin and Thornock (2015) also find evidence that investor attention is
actually no different on Fridays than other weekdays. They find that attention is lower after market
close. Hong and Yu (2009) posit that investors are less attentive during the summer vacation and
they find that both stock return and stock turnover is lower during the summer. The literature still
lacks direct evidence about the temporal variation in investor attention. I investigate the temporally
allocating of investor attention by using the direct measures of investor attention.

DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN
Measuring investor attention by StockTwits data
My complete data set contains the comprehensive metadata of users’ activity kindly
provided by StockTwits.com over the period from January 2010 to December 2018. However, I
focused my analysis in the more recent period from January 2013 to December 2018 given that
StockTwits was not so popular during the earlier years and the tweet activity was significantly
less. 6 By retrieving the cashtag “$” (e.g., $AAPL, $DELL, $GRPN), I can aggregate the
conversation per ticker. If a message mentions more than one ticker symbols, I treat each ticker
symbol as a unique post. The other additional metadata of a typical message referring to a specific
stock includes information such as message content, post date and time, trader/investor specific
data, and the exchange this stock is traded on. I filtered the symbols by choosing those are traded
on NYSE and NASDAQ and the initial sample consists of approximately 66 million tweets. I then
match stock symbols to firms’ PERMNOs, a unique firm identifier provided by CRSP. Finally, I

6

The data from 2012 was used to compute the abnormal attention of January 2013.
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require the stocks have a share code of 10 or 11 in the Center for Research in Securities Prices
(CRSP) database.
Firm-level attention
I measure daily investor attention to a specific stock by using unique dynamic analytics
from StockTwits. Specifically, I compute the daily message volume of a specific stock on
StockTwits to measure the abnormal attention of this stock on that day. To capture the deviation
of investor attention from the “normal” level and any potential time trends, the investor attention
measure is standardized by the baseline level of investor attention to rule out any seasonality and
day of week effects. The abnormal attention of a specific stock 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 measured by the change

in message volume 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is defined by Equation (1). 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the difference between the
message volume of stock i on day t and its average message volume over a 45-day window prior
to 2 weeks before day t (t-60, t-15) scaled by the average. Drake, Roulstone and Thornock (2012)
find that investors’ information demanding activity through Google search increases about two
weeks prior the earnings announcement. Consequently, I skip the most recent two weeks in the
calculation of the benchmark to avoid potential spillover effects of the investor attention. As
abnormal message volume on the announcement day measures the amount of increased discussion
and posts about a firm, it provides a direct measure of investor attention to earnings announcements.
This detrended measure removes time trends and seasonality. Also, the 45-day window captures
the baseline level of attention so that these measures will provide a proxy for how much increased
attention investors are paying to earnings.
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =

𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 −𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,(𝑡𝑡−60,𝑡𝑡−15)
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,(𝑡𝑡−60,𝑡𝑡−15)

(1)
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Consequently, this measure of attention indicates the deviation from the benchmark
baseline level. For example, a “0.5” score captures a deviation of 50% of attention of a specific
stock on a given day from the “normal” level.
Market level attention
I measure market-level attention by looking at the relevant messages about the board
market. Specifically, I screened for messages containing the cashtags of $SPY, $ES_F, and $SPX
and compute the daily message volume of these cashtags on StockTwits to measure the abnormal
attention to board market on that day. The abnormal market attention 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 measured by the
change in message volume of board market 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 is defined by Equation (2). 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴

is the difference between the message volume of board market on day t and the average message
volume from day t-60 to day t-15, scaled by the average.
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 =

𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 −𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑡𝑡−60,𝑡𝑡−15)
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑡𝑡−60,𝑡𝑡−15)

(2)

Earnings announcements
I obtain quarterly earnings announcement data from I/B/E/S from 2013 to 2018 and merge
earnings announcement data and attention data from StockTwits and require non-missing values
in both datasets. I decide the earnings announcement dates by comparing the dates reported by
both Compustat and I/B/E/S. When there is discrepancy between the two sources, following
DellaVigna and Pollet (2009), I take the earlier date of the two. Following Hirshleifer, Lim and
Teoh (2009), my sample firms are limited to those that have I/B/E/S coverage so I expect accurate
earnings announcement dates from my sample. Following DellaVigna and Pollet (2009), I measure
earnings surprise (SUE) using Equation (3). It is the difference between the announced actual
EPS (Actual EPS) of the quarter as reported by I/B/E/S and the median of the most recent forecast
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(Consensus Forecast) acquired from the I/B/E/S detail file divided by the stock price at the end of
the corresponding quarter (Price QE). If an analyst made multiple forecasts in a given quarter, the
consensus forecast used is the most recent one prior to the announcement. To keep the forecasts
most up-to-date, I require the forecasts were issued in the last 60 calendar days before the earnings
announcement. Also, I exclude observations: 1) when actual earning or forecast is larger in
absolute value than the stock price, 2) when the stock price is less than $1, and 3) those with a
missing earnings surprise. The final sample includes 48,765 earnings announcements for 2,814
unique stocks. I include full I/B/E/S earnings announcements data when I compute the number of
competing announcements.
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 =

𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸−𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹
𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄

(3)

It is believed that investors react in the direction of the SUE, i.e., positive response to

positive SUE and negative response to negative SUE. Since investors can respond to
announcements made during trading hours immediately, following Michaely, Rubin and
Vedrashko (2013), if an announcement is made during trading hours, I count the earnings
announcement and match it with attention measured on the same day. If an announcement is made
after trading hours (i.e., after 16:00) or during a holiday, day “zero” is defined as the following
trading day and I count the earnings announcement and match it with attention on that day.
Because the relationship between announcement-day abnormal returns and the raw
earnings surprise is nonlinear (e.g., (Bernard and Thomas (1989); Kothari (2001 )), I rank and sort
SUE into quintiles from the most negative low 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1 to the most positive 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆5 to mitigate the

nonlinear relation following prior literature (e.g., (DellaVigna and Pollet (2009); Hirshleifer, Lim
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and Teoh (2009); Sheng (2019 )). Then the relationship between CAR and the earnings surprise
quintiles is almost linear.
Stock price response to earnings news is measured by cumulative abnormal return (CAR)
for each stock. The CARs are calculated using the market model parameters estimated over the
period between 300 and 46 days prior to the earnings announcement and adjusted by the CRSP
value-weighted index return. For the immediate price response, I use CAR over the 2-trading-day
window [0, 1] surrounding the earnings announcement. For post announcement drift, following
DellaVigna and Pollet (2009), I use 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[2,75]. 7 Stock return on day t are measured from the
market close (16:00) on day t-1 to the market close (16:00) on day t.
Macroeconomic announcements
I obtain information for macro-news announcements from Bloomberg. I employ the full
list of macroeconomic announcements from Bloomberg to count the number of macro-news

announcements on a specific day. However, macro-news announcements have different impacts
on investor attention allocation and the stock market. Based on the Bloomberg relevance index 8
during my sample period, I define a day to be an important macro-news day (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼) if one of
the following macro-news announced on that day: the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)

rate decision, nonfarm payrolls, ISM manufacturing index, initial jobless claims, CPI MoM and
gross domestic product (GDP) growth. All these macroeconomic news announcements have a
Bloomberg relevance score no less than 95. Since macro-news are announced before or during
trading hours, I match macro-news announcements with 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 and 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 of the same day.

7
8

Alternative choice of windows is also used.
A measure of the importance of macro-economic news assigned by Bloomberg, ranging from 0 to 100.
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Summary statistics
Table 2 reports summary statistics based on the full sample. Exploring the stock
characteristics in the sample indicates that these are not small firms. The mean (median) size is
about 8.6 (1.4) billion. The mean (median) institutional holdings make up about 70% (78%) of
shares outstanding. The mean (median) number of analysts following a stock is 9 (7). On average,
there are 171 earnings announcements and 8 macro-news announcements on a typical earnings
announcement day. The mean immediate reaction to an earnings announcement (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[0,1]) is
0.08%, and the mean of the PEAD (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[2,75]) is -0.38%. The mean firm-level abnormal attention
is 16.91 and the mean board market abnormal attention is 0.41 on a typical earnings announcement
day. The standard deviation is 39.03 and 0.52, suggesting that there is considerable cross-sectional
and time-series variation in both firm-level and market-level attention.

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
What determines the allocation of investor attention on a typical day or in a typical month?
Friday vs. other weekdays
Figure 1, Figure 2, and Table 3 present the day of week patterns of firm-level abnormal
attention and the number of earnings announcements. In Table 3 Panel A, it shows that earnings
announcements cluster by day of week and demonstrate a strong seasonal pattern. As documented
in prior studies, the number of announcements is lowest on Friday (5,692) and higher on Tuesday,
Wednesday, and Thursday (DellaVigna and Pollet (2009); Hirshleifer, Lim and Teoh (2009 )).
Monday has twice as many announcements as Friday has and the average number of
announcements from Monday to Thursday is 20,630. The mean and median 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 is also higher
on Tuesday, Wednesday, and Tuesday. The difference of means test and the non-parametric

median test show that the mean and median 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 on Friday (0.212 and 0.217) is lower than on
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other weekdays (0.407 and 0.402) and the difference is significant at 1% level. Please note that
weekend days have negative abnormal attention and the lowest number of announcements,
suggesting that investors pay less attention to stocks during non-trading days.
In Panel B, I compare the mean and median 𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 on earnings announcement days with

non-announcement days. It shows that on earnings announcement days, the mean and median
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 on Friday (0.239 and 0.234) is lower than on other weekdays (0.437 and 0.422) and the

difference is significant at 1% level. On days without earnings announcements, the mean and the
median 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 is negative on all weekdays and the mean and median 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 drops the most on

Thursday. The mean and median 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 is higher on announcement days than on nonannouncement days and the difference is significant, suggesting that investors pay more attention
to stocks on days with earnings announcements. It is also worth noting that on non-announcement
days, the mean and median 𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 on Friday (-0.459 and -0.373) is still lower than on other
weekdays (-0.199 and -0.09) and the difference is statistically significant. The findings suggest
that investors are generally less attentive on Friday either with or without earnings news released,
which is consistent with DellaVigna and Pollet (2009).
Figure 3, Figure 4, and Table 4 present the day of week patterns of market-level abnormal
attention and the number of macro-news announcements. In Table 4 Panel A, it shows that
macroeconomic announcements are generally released during weekdays and the mean and median
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 is lowest on weekends, suggesting that investors pay less attention to the board market
during non-trading days. The number of announcements is lowest on Monday and higher on other

weekdays. The mean and median 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 is lowest on Monday and the mean and median
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 on Friday is only slightly higher than on Monday. The mean and median 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
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on Friday (0.248 and 0.164) is lower than on other weekdays (0.389 and 0.286) and the difference
is significant at 1% level.
In Panel B, I compare the mean and median 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 on macro-news announcement

days with non-announcement days. It shows that the mean and median 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 is lower on

non-announcement days than on announcement days, suggesting that investors pay less attention
to board market on days without macro-news announcements. It is also worth noting that on macronews announcement days, the mean and median 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 on Friday (0.283 and 0.183) is lower

than on other weekdays (0.435 and 0.309) and the difference is significant at 1% level, suggesting
that investors pay less attention to macro-news announced on Friday.
Summer vs. other months
Figure 5, Figure 6, and Table 5 present the month of year patterns of firm-level abnormal
attention and the number of earnings announcements. As documented in Hirshleifer, Lim and Teoh
(2009), the number of announcements show a 3-month cycle, with the lowest number of
announcements in March, June, September, and December. Accordingly, the mean 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 in these

months is negative and lower than in other months. It is also worth noting that the number of
announcements in January is even lower than in March but the mean 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 is much higher in
January. In Panel A, it indicates that the mean and median 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 in Summer (July and August) is
higher than in other months and the difference is significant at 10% level. The finding differs from
with Hong and Yu (2009) which finds that investors are less attentive during summer holidays.
In Panel B, I compare the mean and median 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 on earnings announcement days with

non-announcement days by month of year. On earnings announcement days, the mean 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 in

Summer is higher than in other months and the difference is significant at 5% level. It is also worth
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noting, in each month, the mean 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 is positive on earnings announcement days and is negative

on non-announcement days, and the difference is significant. The findings suggest that investors

pay less attention to stocks on days without earnings announcements.
Figure 7, Figure 8, and Table 6 present the month of year patterns of market-level abnormal
attention and the number of macro-news announcements. In Table 6 Panel A, it shows that the
macro-news is released evenly among months and there is no significant difference between the
mean and median 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 in Summer and in other months. In Panel B, I compare the mean and

median 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 on macro-news announcement days with non-announcement days by month of
year. In each month, the mean 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 is positive on macro-news announcement days and
negative on non-announcement days, and the difference is significant, suggesting that investors
pay less attention to board market when there is no macro-news announced on that day.
What determines allocation of investor attention on earnings announcement days?
In this section, I explore a set of variables that are associated with abnormal firm-level
investor attention on earnings announcement days. In order to examine whether macro-news
announcements strengthen (Chen, Jiang and Zhu (2018); Sheng (2019 )) or attenuate the attention
(Huang, Huang and Lin (2018); Liu and Peng (2015); Peng and Xiong (2006 )) to earnings
announcements, I include a dummy variable 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴. 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 is equal to 1 if a day is an

announcement day for one of the important macroeconomic announcements (i.e., FOMC, GDP,
ISM PMI, nonfarm payroll, initial jobless claims and CPI). To investigate the distracting effect of
same-day announcements from other firms (Hirshleifer, Lim and Teoh (2009 )), I include 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁,

which is the natural logarithm of number of same-day earnings announcements. Using the full list

of macro-news announcements, I also include 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁, which is the natural logarithm of number

of same-day macro-news announcements. 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 is absolute earnings surprise. 𝐿𝐿𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 is the
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natural logarithm of market capitalization. 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 is the is the natural logarithm of book to market

ratio. 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 is the natural logarithm of 1+ the number of analysts covering the stock.
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 is institutional ownership which is the percentage of shares held by institutional

investors by using the most recent information before the announcement date. 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 is the

standard deviation of daily stock returns from day t-60 to day t-15. 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 is the stock’s

abnormal turnover. 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 is the logarithm of Amihud (2002) illiquidity. 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 is the

abnormal market-level attention on day t. I also include dummies 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 and 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 to
address the seasonality of investor attention (DellaVigna and Pollet (2009); Hong and Yu (2009 )).
I run the following regression:
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡

= 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽5 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + 𝛽𝛽6 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
+ 𝛽𝛽7 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 + 𝛽𝛽8 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + 𝛽𝛽9 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + 𝛽𝛽10 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 + 𝛽𝛽11 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡
+ 𝛽𝛽13 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽𝛽14 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆

+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡

(4)

The results are reported in Table 7. Motivated by the prior studies, in column (1), I examine
attention allocation among concurrent competing information shocks ( 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 and 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁), on

important macro-news announcement days, on Friday, and in summer. The constant is 48.96 and
is statistically significant at 1% level, suggesting that the abnormal firm-level attention is
significantly higher on earnings announcement days. The coefficients on 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 and 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 are

-6.40 and -3.65, both significant at 1% level. The findings suggest that investors are less attentive
on Friday and days with high volume of concurrent competing news, which is consistent with prior
studies (DellaVigna and Pollet (2009); Hirshleifer, Lim and Teoh (2009 )). The coefficient on
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 is 1.16, statistically significant at 1% level, suggesting that macro-news
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announcements strengthen the attention to earnings announcements. The coefficient on 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆

is 1.04 and statistically significant at 5% level, suggesting that investors are not less attentive in
summer holidays, which differs with Hong and Yu (2009). The coefficients on 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 is -0.14,
however is not statistically significant.

In column (2), I examine variables that are related to equilibrium outcomes and various
firm characteristics. All variables except 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 are statistically significant. It shows that firms
with high institutional ownership and the less liquid stocks with higher abnormal turnover are
associated with higher abnormal firm-level attention on earnings announcement days. It shows
that firms with greater analyst coverage are associated with less abnormal firm-level attention on
earnings announcement days, which differs from prior studies (e.g., Ben-Rephael, Da and Israelsen
(2017)); Liu and Peng (2015)). It also shows that investors pay more attention to the stocks with a
higher magnitude of SUE. The negative coefficient on 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 is potentially driven by the fact that
a high 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 likely correlates with high firm-level attention in the benchmark window (t-60, t15).

In column (3), I regress abnormal firm-level attention on both categories of variables. The
results are generally similar to those in column (1) and (2). Alternatively, controlling for the other
variables, the coefficient on 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 is -0.76 and becomes statistically significant at 5% level

in the full regression, suggesting that investors assign their limited attention accordingly between
firm-level information shocks and market-level information shocks. The coefficient on
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 is 0.65 and is significant at 10% level in the full regression, suggesting that firm-level

investor attention is higher on days with important macro-news. Prior literature suggests that
investors prioritize their limited attention to market-level information over firm-specific
information, therefore investors allocate less attention to firms’ earnings news announced on days
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with important macro news than on other days (Chen, Jiang and Zhu (2018); Huang, Huang and
Lin (2018); Liu and Peng (2015); Peng and Xiong (2006 )). Chen, Jiang and Zhu (2018) and Sheng
(2019) find that the immediate price response is higher and the drift is lower for earnings
announcements with concurrent macro-news announcements but they failed to find the evidence
of increased firm-level retail investor attention on macro-news days by using different measures
of investor attention from mine. Sheng (2019) employs the ticker-searching activity captured by
Google Search Volume Index as a proxy of retail investor attention and finds that retail investor
attention is lower on macro-news days. Chen, Jiang and Zhu (2018) use excess trading volume and
absolute market return as proxies for investor attention and find that firm-level attention is lower
on macro-news days. By using the novel direct measures for both market-level and firm-level
attention, I am be able to distinguish the limited attention disproportionately assigned between
market level and firm level and separate the attention from equilibrium outcomes such as trading
volume that reflects economic dynamism other than investor attention. I find that investors pay
more attention to earnings announcements when important macro-news is released on the same
day, suggesting that firm-level attention is strengthened rather than weakened with concurrent
market-level information shocks. The presence of important macro-news on earnings
announcement days actually leads investors to learn the firms’ earnings announcements more
intensively. Therefore, my evidence is consistent with Sheng (2019) which finds that the
relationship between macro news and earnings news is complementary.
Investor attention, price response to earnings announcements and PEAD
Investors have limited attention and such limited attention leads to underreaction to
earnings announcements and a voluminous literature suggests that investor (in)attention affects the
pricing of earnings and causes the post announcement drift (PEAD). In this section, I examine the
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impact of firm-level investor attention on the pricing of earnings. I investigate whether firm-level
investor attention on the announcement day facilitates faster information incorporation and
alleviates price underreaction to earnings news by examining returns around, and following
earnings announcements. If firm-level investor attention facilitates information incorporation on
the earnings announcement day t, then I expect that the immediate reaction to earnings surprises
will be positively associated with the amount of allocated firm-level investor attention. More
importantly, the amount of allocated firm-level investor attention would result in less drift over
subsequent days. Therefore, abnormal firm-level investor attention 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 is expected to be

positively associated with immediate reaction to earnings surprises and negatively related to PEAD.
Univariate tests
I rank 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 into quintiles from the lowest attention group 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1 to the highest attention

group 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴5. In the highest attention quintile 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴5 and the lowest attention quintile 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1, I

calculate the mean 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[0,1] and 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[2,75] across each earnings surprise quintile from the most

positive 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆5 to the most negative 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1. The spread in 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 between the two extreme earnings
surprise quintiles (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆5− 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1) measures the immediate stock price response and the investor

inattention to earnings news as reflected in PEAD. A large spread in 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[0,1] indicates a stronger
immediate price reaction to earnings news and a larger spread in 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[2,75] indicates a stronger

post-announcement drift. I expect a larger 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[0,1] spread and a smaller 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[2,75] spread for
the highest attention group 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴5 compared to the lowest attention group 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1.

In Figure 9, the abnormal announcement return 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[0,1] is plotted against 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 quintiles

separately for the highest attention group 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴5 and the lowest attention group 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1. The
investor attention on the announcement day facilitates faster information incorporation and leads

to stronger price reaction to earnings news, which is reflected by a steep slope of line 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴5 in the
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graph. In Figure 10, it plots the in-quintile spread (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 5− 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 1) for the highest abnormal

attention quintile 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴5 and the lowest abnormal attention quintile 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1 at alternative horizons.
It shows that the highest abnormal firm-level attention quintile 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴5 has the larger spread
(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆5− 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1) in 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[0,1] and then the spread diminishes subsequently. In contrast, the spread

(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆5− 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1) for the lowest abnormal firm-level attention quintile 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1 is significantly smaller
in 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[0,1] and then grows from 30 days following the announcement day and the spread
becomes substantial subsequently. The findings suggest that the immediate price reaction is

stronger (weaker) for the highest (lowest) abnormal attention quintile 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴5 (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1) and the post-

announcement drift is stronger (weaker) for the lowest (highest) abnormal attention quintile 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1
(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴5). Prior studies suggest that abnormal returns to PEAD are concentrated in the period
surrounding the earnings announcement day. For example, Bernard and Thomas (1989) report that
most of the drift occurs during the first 60 trading days after the announcement day. However, I
find that the drift is getting substantial from day t+61.

Next, I calculate the mean 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[0,1] and 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[2,75] across earnings surprise quintiles by

the extreme attention quintiles 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴5 and 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1. Table 8 reports the result. The in-quintile spread

(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆5− 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1) in 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[0,1] is 15.73% for 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴5 and 3.26% for 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1, both significant at 1%
level. The spread (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆5− 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1) in 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[2,75] is 2.71% (significant at 5% level) for 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1 and

0.15 % (not statistically significant) for 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴5. The results indicate that the immediate price

reaction (drift) is stronger with higher (lower) level of firm-level abnormal attention.
Multivariate tests

In this section, I conduct multivariate regression analysis to control for the effect of firm
characteristics on the relation between short-window abnormal return 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[0,1] or long-window

abnormal return 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴[2,75] and earnings surprise 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆. I examine whether abnormal firm-level

28
investor attention enhances the immediate price reaction to a firm’s earnings surprise and alleviates
the post announcement drift (PEAD). I estimate the following regression:
𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + 𝛽𝛽4 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 + 𝛽𝛽5 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝑛𝑛

+ 𝛽𝛽6 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + 𝛽𝛽7 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 + � 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖
+ 𝜀𝜀

𝑖𝑖=1

(5)

Where 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 is either 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[0,1] for immediate reaction, or 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[2,75] for PEAD. 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 are

the control variables. I include 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿, 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁, 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[−202, −3], and 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 to

control for possible sources of variation in the relation between 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 and 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆. 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[−202, −3]
is the past cumulative abnormal returns over the 200-day window prior to 3 days before day t, used

as a proxy of stock price momentum. 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 is also ranked into quintiles from the lowest
attention group 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀1 to the highest attention group 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀5 . If abnormal firm-level

investor attention 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 is positively associated with immediate reaction to earnings surprises and
negatively related to PEAD, then I expect that 𝛽𝛽5 > 0 for 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[0,1] and 𝛽𝛽5 < 0 for 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[2,75].
Peng and Xiong (2006) suggests that investors allocate their limited attention accordingly between

market-level and firm-level information shocks and the results from Table 7 show that marketlevel attention is negatively associated with firm-level attention, then higher market-level attention
is associated with weaker immediate reaction and stronger PEAD. Therefore, I expect that 𝛽𝛽6 < 0
for 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[0,1] and 𝛽𝛽6 > 0 for 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[2,75]. Chen, Jiang and Zhu (2018) and Sheng (2019) find that

the earnings announcements announced on macro-news days have stronger immediate price
reaction and weaker drift than on other days. The results from Table 7 show that the presence of
important macro-news on earnings announcement days actually leads investors to pay more
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attention to firms’ earnings announcements. Therefore, I expect that 𝛽𝛽7 > 0 for 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[0,1] and 𝛽𝛽7
< 0 for 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[2,75].

Table 9 reports the results. For the immediate price reaction, column (1) represents the

result from a parsimonious specification without including any control variables, column (2) is the
full regression with controls. In both columns, the coefficients on the interaction terms
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 and 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 are both positive and statistically significant at 1% level,

suggesting that the immediate price reaction to earnings announcements is stronger when investors
pay more attention to the earnings announcements and when there is important macro-news
announced on the same day. The coefficient on the interaction term 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 is negative

and significant at 1% level as well. This suggests that investors allocate their limited attention
accordingly between market-level and firm-level therefore investors have more muted initial
reactions to earnings announcements if they pay more attention to board market.
For the drift, column (3) is the parsimonious specification without including any control
variables and column (4) is the full regression with control variables. In both columns, the
coefficients on the interaction terms 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 and 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 are both negative and

statistically significant, suggesting that higher firm-level abnormal attention and concurrent
important macro-news announcements alleviate initial underreactions to earnings surprises
therefore attenuate the post-announcement drift. The coefficient on the interaction term
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 is positive as expected but not statistically significant.
Investor attention and volume reaction

In this section, I test the impact of investor attention on trading activities. Investor attention
often triggers trading and it is believed that the magnitude of reaction to earnings news can also be
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measured by trading volume in response to the earnings announcement (Hirshleifer, Lim and Teoh
(2009 )). Therefore, if 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 truly captures abnormal firm-level attention, I would expect a strong

concurrent correlation between 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 and investor trading, i.e., a higher trading volume response
with a higher level of abnormal firm-level attention. The stock’s abnormal trading volume 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴

is calculated similarly to Barber and Odean (2008) as the stock’s daily volume on day t divided by
the average trading volume from day t-252 to day t-15.
Table 10 reports the results. Column (1) is the parsimonious specification without including
any control variables and column (2) is the full regression with control variables. Both columns
show that the coefficient on 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 is positive and statistically significant in both columns. On the
other hand, I find no evidence that the abnormal trading volume is higher for firms that announce

earnings on days with important macro-news announcements. The coefficient on 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 is
positive but not statistically significant in both columns. It is also worth noting that controlling for

the other variables, the coefficient on 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 is positive and becomes statistically significant
at 5% level in the full regression, suggesting that the stock’s abnormal trading volume is higher

with higher level of abnormal market-level attention. Since both market-level and firm-level
attention trigger trading, using trading volume as a proxy of attention may conflate the different
effects of market-level and firm-level attention on earnings pricing.
Robustness
Figure 10 shows that the drift becomes substantial from 75 trading days following the
earnings announcement day, to examine whether the findings in Table 9 depend on choice of
window to measure the drift, I run the same examination by using alternative drift windows, i.e.
CAR[2,90] and CAR[2,105]. Table 11 presents the results and indicates that higher firm-level
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abnormal attention and important macro-news released on the earnings announcement day
dampens the post-announcement drift, which is similar to the main findings in Table 9.
I further examine whether the results from Table 9 are robust to alternative measures of
earnings surprise quintiles. I rank firms with negative surprise equally to quintile 1 and 2, and
firms with positive surprise equally to quintile 4 and 5. Firms with zero surprise are assigned to
quintile 3. I then re-estimate Equation (5) with the re-assigned earnings surprise quintiles. Table
12 reports the results. For the immediate price reaction, column (1) represents the result from a
parsimonious specification without including any control variables, column (2) is the full
regression with controls. In both columns, the coefficients on the interaction terms 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴,
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴, and 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 have the expected signs, all significant at 1% level.
For the drift, column (3) is the parsimonious specification without including any control variables
and column (4) is the full regression with control variables. The coefficient on the interaction term
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 is negative as expected, significant at 10% level. Overall, the impact of firm-level

and market-level attention on earnings pricing is robust to alternative measures of earnings surprise
quintiles.

CONCLUSION
In this paper, I develop direct measures for both market-level and firm-level attention. By
using such measures, I am be able to distinguish the limited attention strategically assigned
between market level and firm level and separate attention from equilibrium outcomes such as
trading volume that reflects economic dynamism other than investor attention. I provide direct
evidence that firm-level attention is strengthened rather than weakened with concurrent marketlevel information shocks, which differs from existing theories. I find that market-level attention
is negatively associated with firm-level attention and they have different effects on earnings
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pricing. Investors allocate their limited attention accordingly between market-level and firm-level
therefore investors have more muted initial reactions to earnings announcements if they pay more
attention to board market. On the other hand, higher firm-level investor attention and concurrent
important macro-news enhances the immediate price reaction to a firm’s earnings surprise and
alleviates the post-announcement drift (PEAD).
Similar to my findings, Chen, Jiang and Zhu (2018) and Sheng (2019) find the
complementary relationship between macro news and earnings news. Chen, Jiang and Zhu (2018)
hypothesize that the higher combined total attention helps investors have a better understanding of
earnings surprises. Sheng (2019) suggests an extension to existing theories to include investor
attention allocated beyond the stock market. This study suggests that employment of big data in
construction of direct measures of attention is a promising addition to this line for future research.
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FIRM-LEVEL SENTIMENT, THE JOINT EFFECT OF SENTIMENT AND
ATTENTION, AND EARNINGS PRICING
INTRODUCTION
Evidence from prior studies in behavioral finance suggests that investor sentiment drives
stock price away from fundamental value and that arbitraging against sentiment-driven noise
traders can be costly and risky e.g., (Baker and Wurgler (2006); Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny
(1998); Brown and Cliff (2005); Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998); De Long, Shleifer,
Summers and Waldmann (1990); Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003 )). Underlying the prior studies is
the notion that the erroneous expectations about future payoffs of sentiment-driven noise traders
lead to overvaluation (undervaluation) that reverse in the future. This notion challenges efficient
market hypothesis (EMH) and proposes the factor of investor sentiment as a source of market
volatility and anomalies.
A major empirical challenge is how to measure investor sentiment and quantify its
influence because it is not directly observable (Baker and Wurgler (2007 )). Market-based
measures are extensively adopted in prior literature such as mutual funds flow (Ben-Rephael,
Kandel and Wohl (2012 )); overnight (close-to-open) return (Aboody, Even-Tov, Lehavy and
Trueman (2018 )), and the most widely used BW index (Baker and Wurgler (2006 )). The main
drawback of market-based measure is that such equilibrium outcome cannot guarantee a natural
connection to investor sentiment because it can be driven by other economic factors (Da,
Engelberg and Gao (2015 )).
Survey-based measures are frequently used as well such as the University of Michigan
Consumer Sentiment Index (Antoniou, Doukas and Subrahmanyam (2015); Bergman and
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Roychowdhury (2008); Li and Luo (2016); Seybert and Yang (2012 )); the Conference Board
Index of Consumer Confidence (Antoniou, Doukas and Subrahmanyam (2013); Charoenrook
(2005); Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006 )); and Investor Intelligence (Brown and Cliff (2005);
Fisher and Statman (2000); Kurov (2010); Lee, Jiang and Indro (2002 )). However, as addressed
by Da, Engelberg and Gao (2015), macro surveys are not available at a highly disaggregate
temporal level (days, hours, minutes) and are less reliable when the incentive of telling truth is low.
Non-economic events such as weather conditions (Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003); Jiang,
Norris and Sun (2018 )) are also employed to examine sentiment and show such sentimentchanging events have impact on asset prices.
More recently, direct measures constructed from big data of users’ online activities are
employed to explore the effect of investor sentiment on asset price. 9 Da, Engelberg and Gao (2015)
employ Google queries as a sentiment indicator and construct the Financial and Economic
Attitudes Revealed by Search (FEARS) index, showing that FEARS predicts return reversals,
temporary market volatility and mutual funds flow from equity funds to bond funds. However, Da,
Engelberg and Gao (2015) focus on aggregate stock market indices rather than individual stocks.
Today, investors are increasingly utilizing the highly interactive social media platforms to
create, modify and share user-generated content (UGC) (Kietzmann, Hermkens, McCarthy and
Silvestre (2011 )). In the field of behavioral finance, social media detailed data provide insights on
the investors’ perceptions, interactions and behavior, the trends on the market, and the associations
between investors and capital markets. In this paper, I employ social media data in a traditional
event-study framework. I use the proprietary StockTwits official sentiment scores to investigate

Google queries are considered in this paper as big data since it offers insight about the interest of investors in the
searched topic.

9
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the impact of investor sentiment on earnings pricing. I also examine the joint effect of sentiment
and attention on earning pricing.
StcokTwits has granted me access to their firehose for research purposes. 10 I use
StockTwits as my real-world laboratory because it provides an ideal setting to measure investor
sentiment for several reasons:
First, StockTwits is an investor community specifically dedicated to discussing investment
related topics. As of July 2016, StockTwits attracts more than 1.5 million monthly active users,
most of them are young professionals, 60% of its users under 44.

11

The ever-growing users on

StockTwits are active and involved. StockTwits users post about 220 messages a minute during
the trading day and spend an average of 51 minutes a day on StockTwits’ website. 12 Therefore
StockTwits is likely to be truly representative of the entire market.
Second, the cashtagging by “$” makes it easier for investors to identify the tweets on
individual stocks in real time and the time stamp of each tweet makes it easier to connect investor
reactions to market events. In real life, investors all probe the “temperature” of other market
participants to moderate, modify or reinforce their own beliefs. In this sense, StockTwits provides
an inherently precise sampling of perceptions of market participants at a highly disaggregate
temporal level.
Third, StockTwits allows users to tag their content as bullish or bearish. But only about
20%-30% of all content is generally tagged and the tags have a slightly bullish bias. 13 More

10
I would like to thank StockTwits for their generous support and provision of proprietary data for use in this
research.
11
https://techcrunch.com/2016/07/06/stocktwits-raises-funding-gets-new-ceo/
12
https://xconomy.com/san-diego/2017/01/24/new-stocktwits-ceo-looks-to-expand-share-of-investor-community/
13
http://breakthroughanalysis.com/2018/02/26/stocktwits-social-data-science/
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recently, StockTwits adopted a proprietary real-time market sentiment model to bring a full
coverage to all messages posted on StockTwits and to assign a real-time investor-sentiment score
to each message. This allows me to quantify sentiment in a more precise way, revealing its strong
association with stock market dynamics such as direction and volatility.
Fourth, there is a growing number of studies employing crowd-sourced data generated by
StockTwits and we are witnessing more and more evidences that show efficacy of this data. 14
Giannini, Irvine and Shu (2019) study a set of StockTwits posts to investigate the change in
investor disagreement around earnings announcements. They find that investor disagreement is
associated with higher earnings announcement returns. Liew and Budavari (2016) directly employ
the tagged self-identified commentary sentiment data for the period 2012 to 2015 and conclude
that Social Media Factor should be considered as the sixth factor of the Fama-French five-factor
model. Renault (2017) use labeled self-identified commentary sentiment data as training data to
derive investor sentiment from messages posted on StockTwits and find evidence that investor
sentiment predicts intraday stock index returns.
By using direct measures for both firm-level sentiment and firm-level attention, I first
explore the determinants on firm-level sentiment on earnings announcement days. I find that firmlevel sentiment is positively related to market-level sentiment and negatively associated with firmlevel attention, i.e., bullish sentiment is moderated by attention.
Then, I explore the impact of firm-level sentiment on earnings pricing. I find that good
news is actually punished with bullish sentiment but bad news is punished significantly more with

Several studies employ the sentiment data from third party data analytics providers such as Market IQ and
PsychSignal (Argarwal, Azar, Lo and Singh (2018); Karagozoglu and Fabozzi (2017); Karampatsas, Malekpour and
Mason (2017 )). These commercial data providers extract and analyze stock-related messages from Twitter and
StockTwits to build their own sentiment data.
14
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bearish sentiment. Good news is rewarded the most with bearish sentiment. The findings suggest
that investors do not overreact to good news with bullish sentiment but overreact to bad news with
bearish sentiment. I document that both firm-level and market-level sentiment are negatively
associated with the immediate price reaction to earnings news, i.e., the more bullish sentiment is,
the weaker is the immediate price reaction to earnings news. For the drift, I find that drift is stronger
following bullish sentiment.
Last, I examine the joint effect of sentiment and attention on earnings pricing. I find that
good news is rewarded more with high attention when sentiment is either bullish or bearish,
whereas the effect of attention is more pronounced when sentiment is bearish. Bad news is
considerably punished with high attention when sentiment is bearish. The immediate price reaction
is strengthened with high attention when sentiment is either bullish or bearish, whereas the effect
of attention is more pronounced when sentiment is bearish. For the drift, I find that the postannouncement drift is weaker with high attention following bullish sentiment. It is worth noting
that good news with bearish sentiment and high attention has both stronger immediate response
and post-announcement drift.
This paper proposes promising big-data-based direct measures for both market-level and
firm-level sentiment and provides direct evidence that both firm-level and market-level sentiment
are negatively associated with the immediate price reaction to earnings news. This paper also
provides new evidence for the associations between investors’ perceptions, interactions and
behavior and capital markets. In particular, this study extends the evolving literature which studies
the influence of investor behavior and belief on assets (mis)pricing by connecting the sentimentrelated (mis)pricing of earnings to the attention-related (mis)pricing of earnings.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
Investor sentiment and earnings pricing
Earnings announcements are recurring, salient events which are naturally attention-grabbing, and
scrutinized closely by investors. Ball and Brown (1968) first document the post-earnings price
drifts, known as PEAD (post-earnings announcement drift) or earnings momentum. They find that
prices continue to drift in the direction of the earnings news over a period after the announcement.
Bernard and Thomas (1989) conclude that only a small portion of the earnings momentum could
be explained by risk. Among the continuing stream of studies that has attempted to explain the
price reaction to earnings announcements, a large body of literature on the effect of investor
attention on earnings pricing has established that investor attention enhances the immediate price
reaction to a firm’s earnings surprise and alleviates the post-announcement drift (PEAD) (BenRephael, Da and Israelsen (2017); Chen, Jiang and Zhu (2018); DellaVigna and Pollet (2009);
Hirshleifer, Lim and Teoh (2009); Sheng (2019 )). However, there is limited prior research on the
influence of investor sentiment on earnings pricing and mixed evidence is usually presented. Both
using the BW index (Baker and Wurgler (2006 )), Livnat and Petrovits (2009) and Mian and
Sankaraguruswamy (2012) investigate the effect of investor sentiment on earnings pricing and
they get mixed results. Mian and Sankaraguruswamy (2012) find that the stock price sensitivity
to good (bad) earnings news is higher during high (low) sentiment periods than during periods of
low (high) sentiment. The result indicates that investors overreact (underreact) to good earnings
news and underreact (overreact) to bad news during bullish (bearish) times. However, Livnat and
Petrovits (2009) document that the price reaction is greater to extremely good (bad) earnings news
during low (high) sentiment periods. For the drift, Mian and Sankaraguruswamy (2012) find that
the upward drift for good news is stronger following high sentiment and Livnat and Petrovits (2009)
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find the drift for good news is greater following low sentiment. The contradictory evidence from
the prior studies suggests further research is warranted to understand how investor sentiment
influences earnings pricing.
Livnat and Petrovits (2009) and Mian and Sankaraguruswamy (2012) measure investor
sentiment at the market level. Market-wide sentiment roughly aligns with peaks and troughs in
the market (Baker and Wurgler (2006 )) but can have different effects on (mis)pricing crosssectionally. Investors react to firm-specific or market-wide events by different width and depth.
Hence, firm-specific sentiment can have an effect on the (mis)pricing of earnings directly. More
recently, the development of measures of firm-specific investor sentiment enables researchers to
focus on the effect of sentiment at the individual firm level. Several studies employ measures of
firm-specific investor sentiment to investigate the impact of sentiment on the price reaction to
earnings news. Cahan, Chen and Nguyen (2013) employ a measure of firm-specific sentiment
constructed by data from Thomson Reuter’s News Analytics (TRNA) and they find that investors
overreact to positive (negative) earnings surprises when sentiment is positive (negative), which is
consistent with Mian and Sankaraguruswamy (2012). Aboody, Even-Tov, Lehavy and Trueman
(2018) use overnight returns as a proxy for firm-specific investor sentiment and find that the more
positive investor sentiment is, the lower is the price response to earnings announcements. In this
paper, I use the StockTwits official sentiment scores for individual stocks to investigate the impact
of firm-level investor sentiment on earnings pricing.
The interplay of investor attention and sentiment
Within prior behavioral research, a number of studies have already examined the impact of
investor sentiment and investor attention on the price reactions to earnings announcements
separately. But to the best of my knowledge, previous studies have neglected the interplay between
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investor sentiment and investor attention as well as its influence on the price response to earnings
announcements. Nevertheless, it seems intuitive to take the interaction of attention and sentiment
into account: bounded rationality of investors such as underreaction or overreaction must be led
by the attention actually paid to specific information and investors are influenced by sentiment as
long as they actually notice the earnings announcements. In this context, investors who pay
attention to the earnings announcements are also confronted with the corresponding sentiment.
Investor sentiment is a belief about future cash flows (Baker and Wurgler (2007 )), when investors
pay more attention to the incremental cash flows embedded in earnings announcements, they may
modify or reinforce their beliefs. As a result, it is more likely that their trading decisions and
behavior are affected by both attention and sentiment. Hence, I expect a joint effect of investor
attention and sentiment on earnings pricing. However, it is still an open empirical question how,
if at all, the interplay of investor attention and sentiment affects earnings pricing. Therefore, the
purpose of this paper is not to test any particular behavioral theories. Instead, my objective is to
evaluate whether the interaction of attention and sentiment influences the earnings pricing relative
to the null hypothesis that the interaction has no influence.

DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN
StockTwits sentiment score
StockTwits provides real-time streaming of investor sentiment towards individual stocks
and assign a unique sentiment score to each message to indicate the direction and strength of
sentiment. A typical message from the sentiment stream contains a unique message id, timestamp
of the message creation, sentiment score, and symbols. Symbols include the ticker representing
the stock and other information such as stock id and the exchange this stock is listed. The score
ranges between −1 and 1, with −1 representing completely bearish sentiment, 0 representing
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neutral sentiment, and 1 representing completely bullish sentiment. The sentiment score is not
binary, so a slightly bearish message will be −0.25, and inversely, a slightly bullish message will
be 0.25. For messages with multiple symbols, I attribute the same sentiment score to all symbols
in the message. I measure investor sentiment by using the mean daily sentiment score (DSS). I
rank 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 into quintiles from the most bearish sentiment group (DSS1) to the most bullish

sentiment group (DSS5). I use the mean daily sentiment scores of $SPY from StockTwits to
measure market-level sentiment.
Firm-level investor attention
I measure daily investor attention to a specific stock by using unique dynamic analytics
from StockTwits. Specifically, I compute the daily message volume of a specific stock on
StockTwits to measure the abnormal attention of this stock on that day. To capture the deviation
of investor attention from the “normal” level and any potential time trends, the investor attention
measure is standardized by the baseline level of investor attention to rule out any seasonality and
day of week effects. The abnormal attention of a specific stock (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ) measured by the change

in message volume (𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ) is defined by Equation (3). (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ) is the difference between

the message volume of stock i on day t and its average message volume over a 45-day window
prior to 2 weeks before day t (t-60, t-15) scaled by the average. Drake, Roulstone and Thornock
(2012) find that investors’ information demanding activity through Google search increases about
two weeks prior the earnings announcement. Consequently, I skip the most recent 2 weeks in the

calculation of the benchmark to avoid potential spillover effects of the investor attention. As
abnormal message volume on the announcement day measures the amount of increased discussion
and posts about a firm, it provides a direct measure of investor attention to earnings announcements.
This detrended measure removes time trends and seasonalities. Also, the 45-day window captures
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the baseline level of attention so that these measures will provide a proxy for how much increased
attention investors are paying to earnings.
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 =

𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 −𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,(𝑡𝑡−60,𝑡𝑡−15)
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖,(𝑡𝑡−60,𝑡𝑡−15)

(1)

I rank 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 into quintiles from the lowest attention group (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1) to the highest attention group

(𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴5).

Earnings news
I obtain earnings announcements dates by comparing the dates reported by both Compustat
and I/B/E/S. When there is discrepancy between the two sources, following DellaVigna and Pollet
(2009), I take the earlier date of the two. Following DellaVigna and Pollet (2009), I measure
earnings surprise (SUE) using Equation (4). It is the difference between the announced actual EPS
(Actual EPS) of the quarter as reported by I/B/E/S and the median of the most recent forecast
(Consensus Forecast) acquired from the I/B/E/S detail file divided by the stock price at the end of
the corresponding quarter (Price QE). If an analyst made multiple forecasts in a given quarter, the
consensus forecast used is the most recent one prior to the announcement. To keep the forecasts
most up-to-date, I require the forecasts were issued in the last 60 calendar days before the earnings
announcement. Also, I exclude observations: 1) when actual earning or forecast is larger in
absolute value than the stock price, 2) when the stock price is less than $1, and 3) those with a
missing earnings surprise.
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 =

𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸−𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄

(2)

It is believed that investors react in the direction of the SUE, i.e., positive response to

positive SUE and negative response to negative SUE. Because the relationship between
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announcement-day abnormal returns and the raw earnings surprise is nonlinear (e.g., (Bernard and
Thomas (1989); Kothari (2001 )), I rank and sort SUE into quintiles from the most negative low
(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1) to the most positive (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆5) to mitigate the nonlinear relation following prior literature
e.g., (DellaVigna and Pollet (2009); Hirshleifer, Lim and Teoh (2009); Sheng (2019 )). Then the
relationship between CAR and the earnings surprise quintiles is almost linear.
I use the announcement day (day 0) sentiment to examine the effect of sentiment on the
return of short window [0, 1] and PEAD. Following Michaely, Rubin and Vedrashko (2013), if
an announcement is made before or during trading hours (i.e., 0:00-15:59), I match it with
sentiment measured on the same day. If an announcement is made after trading hours (i.e., 16:0023:59) or during a holiday, day 0 is defined as the next trading day and I match it with sentiment
on that day.
Stock price response to earnings news is measured by cumulative abnormal return (CAR)
for each stock. The CARs are calculated using the market model parameters estimated over the
period between 300 and 46 days prior to the earnings announcement and adjusted by the CRSP
value-weighted index return. For the immediate price response, I use CAR over the short window
[0,1] surrounding the earnings announcement. For post announcement drift, I use 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[2,90]. The
spread in 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 between the two extreme earnings surprise quintiles (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆5− 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1) measures the
immediate stock price response and the investor inattention to earnings news as reflected in PEAD.

Therefore, a large spread in 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[0,1] indicates a stronger immediate price reaction to earnings
news and a larger spread in 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[2,90] indicates a stronger post-announcement drift. Stock return
on day t are measured from the market close (16:00) on day t-1 to the market close (16:00) on day
t.
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EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
What drives investor sentiment on earnings announcement days?
In this section, I explore a set of variables that are associated with firm-level investor
sentiment on earnings announcement days. In order to investigate the impact of market-wide
sentiment on firm-level sentiment, I use the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index
(𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶) as a proxy for monthly market sentiment, and the daily sentiment scores of $SPY extracted
from StockTwits (𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀) as a proxy for daily market sentiment. I control for the impact of
investor attention (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴) on investor sentiment and also include a dummy 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 to address the

possible seasonality of investor sentiment. I also control for the impact of earnings surprises

(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆) and other possible sources of variation in the relation between 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 and 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 .

𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 is the natural logarithm of 1+ the number of analysts covering the stock. 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿

is the natural logarithm of market capitalization. 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 is the natural logarithm of book to market

ratio. 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 is the percentage of shares outstanding held by institutional investors. I run the

following regression:

𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽4 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 + 𝛽𝛽5 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + 𝛽𝛽6 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 +

𝛽𝛽7 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 + 𝛽𝛽8 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 + 𝛽𝛽9 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 +
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡

(3)

The results are reported in Table 13. Column (1) presents the results from parsimonious

specification examining the impact of earnings surprises (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆), investor attention (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴), and
market-level sentiment on firm-level investor sentiment. The coefficient on earnings surprises

(𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆) is 0.21, statistically significant at 1% level, indicating that investor sentiment is positively
associated with earnings surprise, i.e., more positive earnings surprise, more bullish sentiment on

45
earnings announcement days. For the market-level sentiment measures, the coefficients on 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶

and 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 are both positive and statistically significant, suggesting that firm-level sentiment is
positively associated with market-level sentiment. It is worth noting that the coefficient on investor

attention (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴) is negative (−0.02) and statistically significant at 1% level, suggesting that bullish
sentiment is moderated by investor attention.
Column (2) presents the results of the full regression controlling for various firm
characteristics. The results are generally similar to those in the column (1). The coefficients on
earnings surprise (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆), investor attention (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴), and market-level sentiment keep the same signs,
all statistically significant. It shows that larger firms with higher institutional ownership and lower
B/M ratio, followed by more analysts have more bullish investor sentiment on earnings
announcement days. It is worth noting that the coefficient on dummy 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 is negative and
significant at 1% level, suggesting that investors are less bullish to earnings announced on Fridays.
Sentiment and immediate price response to earnings announcements
Figure 11 shows that the most bullish sentiment line (DSS5) is above the most bearish
sentiment line (DSS1), suggesting that the price reaction to all earnings surprise quintiles is more
positive when sentiment is more bullish. The extreme bearish sentiment line (DSS1) approaches
to the extreme bullish sentiment line (DSS5) at the side of the most positive earnings surprise
quintile (SUE5), but plunges at the side of the most negative earnings surprise quintile (SUE1),
suggesting that bad news is punished significantly more when investor sentiment is bearish.
Table 14 Panel A shows the mean 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[0,1] across earnings surprise quintiles by the

extreme sentiment quintiles. The difference between the two extreme sentiment quintiles DSS5
and DSS1 across all earnings surprise quintiles is positive and significant at 1% level, increasing
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monotonically from the most positive (SUE5) to the most negative (SUE1), suggesting that
investors react more positively to earnings news with bullish sentiment and bad news receives
more negative price reaction when investors are bearish. In the most bullish sentiment quintile
(DSS5), the mean CAR[0,1] is only negative for the most negative earnings surprise quintile
(SUE1) and positive for all other earnings surprise quintiles. The most positive earnings surprise
quintile (SUE5) has an average CAR of 4.09% and the most negative earnings surprise quintile
(SUE1) has an average CAR of −0.51% and the spread (SUE5-SUE1) is 4.60%, which is
statistically significant at 1% level.
In the most bearish sentiment quintile (DSS1), the mean CAR[0,1] is only positive for the
most positive earnings surprise quintile (SUE5) and negative for all other earnings surprise
quintiles. The most positive earnings surprise quintile (SUE5) has an average CAR of 2.98% and
the most negative earnings surprise quintile (SUE1) has an average CAR of −8.45% and the spread
(SUE5-SUE1) is 11.43%, which is statistically significant at 1% level.
So far, Table 13 Panel A indicates that good news is barely rewarded when sentiment is
bullish but bad news is significantly punished when sentiment is bearish and the spread (SUE5SUE1) is much larger for the bearish sentiment quintile than for the bullish sentiment quintile. To
verify that the different effects of bullish and bearish sentiment on the immediate price reaction to
good and bad earnings news are statistically meaningful, I estimate the following regression:
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[0,1] = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆5 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1 + 𝛽𝛽4 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷5 + 𝛽𝛽5 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆5 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷5
+ 𝛽𝛽6 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷5 + 𝛽𝛽7 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆5 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1 + 𝛽𝛽8 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1
+ 𝜀𝜀

(4)
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𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆5 (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1) is a dummy that is equal to 1 for the top (bottom) earnings surprise quintile. 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷5

(𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1) is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 for the most bullish (bearish) quintile. Thus, the
coefficients on the interaction terms 𝛽𝛽5 to 𝛽𝛽8 examine different effects of bullish and bearish

sentiment on the immediate reaction to good and bad earnings news.

Table 15 reports the results. The coefficients on 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆5 (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1) and 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷5 (𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1) all have

the expected signs, significant at 1% level, suggesting that investors react in the direction of SUE
and DSS. It is worth noting that the coefficient on the interaction terms 𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈5 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷5 is −0.015

(t = −6.01), significant at 1% level, suggesting that good news is actually punished when sentiment
is bullish. The finding is similar to Aboody, Even-Tov, Lehavy and Trueman (2018) which finds
that investors react less positively to earnings when they are bullish than when they are bearish.
The coefficient on 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆5 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1 is 0.029 (t = 6.98) and significant at 1% level, suggesting that

good news is rewarded the most when sentiment is bearish. This finding is in consistency with
Livnat and Petrovits (2009) which finds that good news is rewarded more when sentiment is low.
The coefficient on 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1 is −0.023 (t = −8.45) and significant at 1% level, suggesting

that bad news is punished significantly more when sentiment is bearish. Prior studies such as
Cahan, Chen and Nguyen (2013) and Mian and Sankaraguruswamy (2012) find that investors
overreact to good news (bad news) when sentiment is high (low). My evidence suggests that
investors do not overreact to good news when sentiment is high (bullish) but overreact to bad news
when sentiment is low (bearish).
To examine whether the difference between in-quintile spread (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆5−𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1) of the most
bearish sentiment quintile (𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1) and the most bullish sentiment quintile (𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷5) is statistically
meaningful, I estimate the following regression:
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𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[0,1] = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷5 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1 + 𝛽𝛽4 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷5
+ 𝛽𝛽5 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1

(5)

+ 𝜀𝜀

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 is a dummy that is equal to 1 for the top earnings surprise quintile and 0 for the bottom
earnings surprise quintile. 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷5 (𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1) is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 for the most

bullish (bearish) quintile. Thus, the coefficients 𝛽𝛽4 and 𝛽𝛽5 test the different effects of bullish and

bearish sentiment on CAR spreads between good and bad earnings news firms for 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[0,1].

Table 15 column (1) reports the results. The coefficients on the interaction terms

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷5 and 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1 is −0.017 (t=−5.04) and 0.052 (t=11.34), suggesting that
the immediate price reaction is weaker (stronger) when sentiment is bullish (bearish), i.e., investor
sentiment is negatively associated with the immediate price reaction to earnings news.
Then I examine how sentiment affects investors’ reaction to earnings news across all
sentiment and earnings surprises quintiles. I estimate the following regression:
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[0,1]

𝑛𝑛

= 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 + 𝛽𝛽4 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 + 𝛽𝛽5 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 + � 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖

+ 𝜀𝜀

𝑖𝑖=1

(6)

𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 are the control variables. I include 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿, and 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[−202, −3] to control for the

known risk measures of size, book-to-market ratio, and momentum. 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[−202, −3] is the past
cumulative abnormal returns over the 200-day window prior to 3 days before day 0, used as a
proxy of stock price momentum. Extant literature suggests that investor sentiment has a greater
effect on stocks that are hard to value and difficult to arbitrage (Baker and Wurgler (2007); Cahan,
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Chen and Nguyen (2013); Mian and Sankaraguruswamy (2012 )). For those ‘speculative’ stocks,
investors are more likely to be influenced by sentiment because they have less hard information
(Engelberg (2008 )) to rely on. Therefore, I include 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 , and 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
to control cross-sectional variation for hard to value and difficult to arbitrage stocks. Daily market-

level sentiment (𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀) is also ranked into quintiles from the most bearish market-level
sentiment group ( 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀1 ) to the most bullish market-level sentiment group ( 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀5 ).

Because the previous result shows that firm-level investor sentiment is negatively associated with
immediate price reaction to earnings news, I expect that 𝛽𝛽4 < 0 for 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴[0,1].

Table 16 Column (2) and (3) report the results. Column (2) presents the result from a

parsimonious specification without including any control variables, column (3) is the full
regression with controls. In both columns, the coefficients on the interaction terms
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 and 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 are negative and statistically significant, suggesting that

sentiment is negatively related to the immediate price reaction to earnings news, i.e., the more
bullish sentiment is, the weaker is the immediate price reaction to earnings news. These findings
differ from Mian and Sankaraguruswamy (2012) which finds that the Earnings Response
Coefficients (ERCs) for firms with good news are higher (lower) when market sentiment is high
(low).
Sentiment and post-announcement drift
Mian and Sankaraguruswamy (2012) suggests that the impact of sentiment on price
reaction to earnings news extends to several months following the announcement day. Livnat and
Petrovits (2009) provides evidence that investor sentiment influences the abnormal returns
following the announcement day. In this section, I examine whether the impact of sentiment on
the earnings pricing is temporary or continues into the near future.
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Figure 12 plots the spread in average cumulative abnormal returns between the extreme
earnings surprise quintiles (SUE5−SUE1) by the extreme investor sentiment quintiles (DSS5 and
DSS1) over alternative windows. It shows that the immediate price reaction to earnings news is
stronger for the most bearish sentiment quintile (DSS1) than for the most bullish sentiment quintile
(DSS5). The post-announcement drift is stronger for the most bullish sentiment quintile (DSS5)
than for the most bearish sentiment quintile (DSS1), which is getting substantial from 75 days
following the announcement day.
Table 13 Panel B shows the mean 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[2,90] across earnings surprise quintiles by the

extreme sentiment quintiles. It shows that the strongest reverse (-8.45% to 2.13%) occurs for the
most negative earnings surprise following bearish sentiment. It also can be seen that the spread in
average CAR between the extreme earnings surprise quintiles (SUE5−SUE1) is 3.56% for the
most bullish sentiment quintile (DSS5), which is statistically significant at 5% level. The spread
(SUE5−SUE1) is 2.13% for the most bearish sentiment quintile (DSS1), which is statistically
significant at 10% level. Taking into account of the evidence from Figure 12, it indicates that the
strongest reverse for the most negative earnings surprise following bearish sentiment is the reason
of the weaker post-announcement drift for the most bearish sentiment quintile (DSS1).
To test the different effects of bullish and bearish sentiment on CAR spreads between good
and bad earnings news firms for 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[2,90], I re-estimate Equation (5) for post-announcement

drift 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[2,90].

Table 17 reports the results. The coefficient on 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷5 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 0.026 (t=1.77) and the

coefficient on 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1 is positive but not statistically significant, suggesting that the
post-announcement drift is greater following bullish sentiment.
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The joint effect of sentiment and attention on earnings pricing
The immediate price response to earnings news
The results from previous sections suggest that sentiment is negatively related to both
attention and the immediate price reaction to earnings news. Attention is documented to be
positively related to the immediate reaction to earnings surprises, therefore the joint effect of
sentiment and attention on the immediate reaction to earnings news is a question of interest.
The Figure 13 plots the average CAR[0,1] against the extreme earnings surprise quintiles
(SUE5 and SUE1) by the extreme sentiment quintiles (DSS5 and DSS1) with the effect of the
extreme attention quintiles (ATT5 and ATT1). The dash line plots the mean CAR[0,1] that is
without the impact of attention, which is taken as a base line. It shows that for the highest (lowest)
attention quintile ATT5 (ATT1), the line segments D5S5D5S1 and D1S5D1S1 become steeper
(flatter) than the dash line (without the impact of attention), suggesting that the in-quintile spread
(SUE5−SUE1) for both sentiment quintiles (DSS5 and DSS1) turns out to be larger (smaller) than
the base level. Therefore, for the highest (lowest) attention quintile ATT5 (ATT1), the immediate
price reaction to earnings news is stronger (weaker) for both bullish and bearish quintiles (DSS5
and DSS1) than the base level.
The Figure 14 plots the average CAR[2,90] against the extreme earnings surprise quintiles
(SUE5 and SUE1) by the extreme sentiment quintiles (DSS5 and DSS1) with the effect of the
extreme attention quintiles (ATT5 and ATT1). As it can be seen, for the lowest attention quintile
ATT1, both line segments D5S5D5S1 and D1S5D1S1 become steeper than the base line (without
the impact of attention), suggesting that the in-quintile spread (SUE5−SUE1) for both bullish and
bearish sentiment quintiles (DSS5 and DSS1) turns out to be larger than the base level. Therefore,
the post-announcement drift is stronger for both bullish and bearish sentiment quintiles (DSS5 and
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DSS1) with low attention. It shows that for the highest attention quintile ATT5, line segment
D5S5D5S1 becomes flatter than the base line (without the impact of attention), suggesting that the
spread (SUE5−SUE1) for the bullish sentiment quintile DSS5 turns out to be smaller than the base
level. It is also worth noting that for the highest attention quintile ATT5, line segment D1S5D1S1
becomes steeper than the base line (without the impact of attention), suggesting that the spread
(SUE5−SUE1) for the bearish sentiment quintile DSS1 is larger than the base level. Therefore, the
post-announcement drift is weaker (stronger) for the bullish (bearish) sentiment quintile DSS5
(DSS1) with high attention.
Take a look at both Figure 13 and Figure 14, we can find that for the highest attention
quintile (ATT5), the line segment D1S5D1S1 is much steeper than the line segment D5S5D5S1 in
both figures, suggesting that the immediate price reaction and the post-announcement drift are both
stronger for the bearish sentiment quintile (DSS1) with higher attention.
Table 18 presents the numeric evidence of the impact of attention on the CARs across the
earnings surprise quintiles by the extreme investor sentiment quintiles (DSS5 and DSS1). It is
worth noting that with high attention, the mean CAR[0,1] for good news (SUE5) changes from
4.09% to 8.09% for the bullish sentiment quintile (DSS5) and from 2.98% to 9.21% for the bearish
sentiment quintile (DSS1). The mean CAR[0,1] for bad news (SUE1) changes from −8.45% to
−11.69% for the bearish sentiment quintile (DSS1) with high attention, suggesting that the
overreaction to bad news (SUE1) with bearish sentiment is amplified by high attention.
So far, it shows that the effect of investor attention is different across the extreme sentiment
quintiles and earnings surprise quintiles. To verify that these differences are statistically
meaningful, I estimate the following model:
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𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[0,1] = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆5 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷5 + 𝛽𝛽4 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1 + 𝛽𝛽5 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴5 + 𝛽𝛽6 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1 + 𝛽𝛽7 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆5 ×
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷5 + 𝛽𝛽8 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷5 + 𝛽𝛽9 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆5 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1 + 𝛽𝛽10 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1+𝛽𝛽11 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆5 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷5 ×
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴5 + 𝛽𝛽12 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐸5 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴5 + 𝛽𝛽13 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷5 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴5 + 𝛽𝛽14 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1 ×
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴5 + 𝛽𝛽15 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆5 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷5 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1 + 𝛽𝛽16 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆5 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1 + 𝛽𝛽17 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷5 ×
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1 + 𝛽𝛽18 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1 + 𝜀𝜀

(7)

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆5 (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1) is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 for the top (bottom) quintile of

earnings surprise. 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷5 (𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1) is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 for the top (bottom)
quintile of sentiment. 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴5 (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1) is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 for the top (bottom)
attention quintile. Thus, the coefficients of interest 𝛽𝛽11 to 𝛽𝛽18 examine the different impact of
high and low attention across both top and bottom sentiment and earnings surprise quintiles.

Table 18 reports the results. The coefficients on the interaction terms 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆5 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷5 ×

𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴5 and 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆5 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴5 are positive 0.024 (t = 4.78) and 0.059 (t = 5.93), both
significant at 1% level. The evidence suggests that with high attention, good news is rewarded
more when sentiment is either most bullish or most bearish, whereas the effect of attention is more
pronounced when sentiment is bearish. The coefficient on the interaction term 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1 ×

𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴5 is negative −0.054 (t= −9.67), significant at 1% level, suggesting that when sentiment is
most bearish, bad news is considerably punished with high attention. The coefficients on the
interaction terms 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆5 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷5 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1 and 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆5 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1 are negative −0.016
(t=−4.37) and −0.025 (t =−3.64), both significant at 1% level, suggesting that investors underreact

to good news (SUE5) with low attention when sentiment is either most bullish or most bearish.
The coefficient on the interaction term 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1 × 𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1 is positive 0.042 (t=9.85),
significant at 1% level, suggesting that investors underreact to bad news (SUE1) with low attention
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when sentiment is most bearish. The results are consistent with the evidence from Figure 13 and
Table 18.
As it can be seen from Figure 13 and Table 18, the spread (SUE5−SUE1) becomes
significantly larger than the base level for both bullish and bearish sentiment quintiles with high
attention, suggesting that the immediate price reaction to earnings news is strengthened with high
attention no matter whether sentiment is most bullish or most bearish. To verify that these
differences are statistically meaningful, I estimate the following model:
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[0,1]

= 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷5 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1 + 𝛽𝛽4 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + 𝛽𝛽5 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷5

+ 𝛽𝛽6 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1 + 𝛽𝛽7 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷5 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + 𝛽𝛽8 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
+ 𝜀𝜀

(8)

𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 is a dummy that is equal to 1 for the top attention quintile and 0 for the bottom attention

quintile. Thus, the coefficients of interest 𝛽𝛽7 and 𝛽𝛽8 test whether the in-quintile spread
(SUE5−SUE1) for bullish and bearish sentiment quintiles is significantly different with high
attention.

Table 20 presents the results. The coefficients on the interaction terms 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷5 ×

𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 and 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 are both positive 0.043 (t=7.06) and 0.087 (t=8.02),
significant at 1% level, suggesting that the immediate price reaction to earnings news is

strengthened with high attention when sentiment is either bullish or bearish, whereas the effect of
attention is more pronounced when sentiment is bearish. The results are consistent with the
evidence from Figure 13 and Table 18.
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Next I examine the joint effect of investor sentiment and attention on the immediate price
reaction to earnings news across all sentiment, attention and earnings surprise quintiles. To
empirically examine the joint effect of sentiment and attention, I estimate the following regression:
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[0,1]

= 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽𝛽2 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 + 𝛽𝛽3 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + 𝛽𝛽4 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 + 𝛽𝛽5 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 + 𝛽𝛽6 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝑛𝑛

+ 𝛽𝛽7 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 + 𝛽𝛽8 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 + � 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖
+ 𝜀𝜀

𝑖𝑖=1

(9)

𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 are the control variables. I include 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿, and 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[−202, −3] to control for the

known risk measures of size, book-to-market ratio, and momentum. From the results of previous

section, firm-level sentiment and market-level sentiment are both negatively related to the
immediate price reaction, therefore I expect that 𝛽𝛽5 and 𝛽𝛽7 are < 0 for 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[0,1]. Firm-level

attention is documented to be positively associated with the immediate price reaction to earnings
news, e.g., (Hirshleifer, Lim and Teoh (2009 )), thus I expect that 𝛽𝛽6 > 0 for 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[0,1]. Table 20

shows that the immediate price reaction to earnings news is strengthened with high attention no
matter whether sentiment is bullish or bearish, therefore I expect that 𝛽𝛽8 > 0 for 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅[0,1].

Table 21 reports the results. Column (1) presents the results from parsimonious

specification examining the impact of sentiment, and the joint effect of sentiment and attention on
the immediate price response to earnings news. Column (2) presents the results of the full
regression with control variables. As it can be seen in both columns, the coefficients 𝛽𝛽5 and 𝛽𝛽7 are

both negative and significant at 1% level, suggesting that sentiment is negatively associated with
the immediate price reaction to earnings news, i.e., the more bullish sentiment is, the weaker is the
immediate reaction. The coefficient 𝛽𝛽6 is positive and significant at 1% level, suggesting that
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attention is positively related to the immediate reaction to earnings news, i.e., the higher attention
is, the stronger is the immediate response. The coefficient 𝛽𝛽8 is positive and significant at 1% level,

suggesting that the immediate price reaction is generally strengthened with highe attention across
sentiment quintiles.
The post-announcement drift
Since I have taken into account both investor sentiment and investor attention in the
previous investigation of their joint effect on the abnormal returns around announcement, in this
section I examine how the interaction of sentiment and attention influences the well-documented
post-announcement drift.
Figure 15 plots the mean CAR against the extreme sentiment quintiles (DSS5 and DSS1)
and earnings surprise quintiles (SUE5 and SUE1) with low attention (ATT1) at different horizons.
It shows that with low attention, prices continue to drift in the direction of the earnings news over
a period after the announcement, which is in consistency with prior literature. Figure 16 plots the
mean CAR against the extreme sentiment quintiles (DSS5 and DSS1) and earnings surprise
quintiles (SUE5 and SUE1) with high attention (ATT5) at different horizons. As it can be seen,
with high attention, the drift is generally weaker but the drift is stronger for good news following
bearish sentiment. To verify that these differences are statistically meaningful, I re-estimate
Equation (7) for the post-announcement drift 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[2,90].

Table 22 reports the results. The coefficient on the three-way interaction term

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆5 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴5 is positive 0.037 (t=1.86) and significant at 5% level, indicating that the
drift is stronger for good news following bearish sentiment with high attention. The finding is
consistent with the evidence from Figure 16.
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Figure 17 plots the in-quintile spread (SUE5−SUE1) by the extreme sentiment (DSS5 and
DSS1) and attention (ATT5 and ATT1) quintiles at different horizons. It shows that the spread in
drift is larger with low attention for both bullish and bearish sentiment quintiles (A1D5 and A1D1).
It is not surprising to see the spread is also larger with high attention for the bearish sentiment
quintile (A5D1) as the result from Table 22 shows that the drift is stronger for good news following
bearish sentiment with high attention. It is worth noting that the spread in drift is the smallest with
high attention following bullish sentiment (A5D5). To verify that these differences are statistically
meaningful, I re-estimate Equation (8) for the post-announcement drift 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[2,90].

Table 23 reports the results. The coefficient on the three-way interaction term

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷5 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 is negative −0.04 (t=−1.67) and significant at 10% level, suggesting

that the post-announcement drift is weaker with high attention following bullish sentiment. The
coefficient on the three-way interaction term 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 is positive 0.032 but
not statistically significant.

Last, I examine the joint effect of investor sentiment and attention on the postannouncement drift across all sentiment, attention and earnings surprise quintiles. To empirically
examine the joint effect, I re-estimate Equation (9) for the drift 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[2,90].

Table 24 presents the results. Column (1) presents the results from parsimonious

specification examining the impact of sentiment, and the joint effect of sentiment and attention on
the post-announcement drift. Column (2) presents the results of the full regression with control
variables. In Column (1), the coefficient of the three-way interaction term 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 is

negative −0.0003 (t=−1.51) but not statistically significant. This is perhaps not surprising given
that investigation of long-term abnormal return is treacherous (Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999 )) and
the earnings news may be a noisy proxy for all the firm-specific news announced during the year
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as suggested by Mian and Sankaraguruswamy (2012). In Column (2), the coefficient of the threeway interaction term 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 is negative −0.0006 (t=−2.83) and significant at 1% level,
suggesting that the post-announcement drift is weaker with high attention following bullish
sentiment.

CONCLUSION
In this paper, I employ social media data in a traditional event-study framework. I use the
proprietary StockTwits official sentiment score as a direct measure of firm-level sentiment to
investigate the impact of investor sentiment on earnings pricing. I report evidence that good news
is punished (rewarded) when sentiment is bullish (bearish) and bad news is punished significantly
more when sentiment is bearish. My evidence suggests that investors do not overreact to good
news when sentiment is high (bullish) but overreact to bad news when sentiment is low (bearish).
For the immediate response, I find that the immediate price reaction to earnings news is weaker
when sentiment is bullish. For the drift, I find that the post-announcement drift is stronger
following bullish sentiment.
In particular, this study extends the evolving literature which studies the influence of
investor behavior and belief on assets (mis)pricing by connecting the sentiment-related
(mis)pricing of earnings to the attention-related (mis)pricing of earnings. I employ direct measures
of firm-level attention and sentiment to explore the joint effect of attention and sentiment on
earnings pricing. I find that good news is rewarded more with high attention no matter whether
sentiment is bullish or bearish, whereas the effect of attention is more pronounced when sentiment
is bearish. The evidence also suggests that bad news is considerably punished with high attention
when sentiment is bearish. For the immediate response, I find that the immediate price reaction is
strengthened with high attention no matter whether sentiment is bullish or bearish, whereas the
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effect of attention is more pronounced when sentiment is bearish. For the drift, I find that the postannouncement drift is weaker with high attention following bullish sentiment. It is worth noting
that good news with bearish sentiment and high attention has both stronger immediate response
and post-announcement drift. Existing literature, however, suggests that high investor attention is
associated with stronger immediate price reactions and weaker post announcement price drifts to
firms’ earnings announcements. Thus, my findings reflect the joint effect of attention and
sentiment and provide new evidence that investor attention and sentiment do jointly affect the
source of excess returns documented in the prior earnings-based market anomaly literature. This
finding furthers our understanding of the influence of investor behavior and belief on assets
(mis)pricing.
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CONCLUSION
In this dissertation, I develop direct measures for both market-level and firm-level attention
and sentiment. In the first essay, I provide direct evidence that firm-level attention is strengthened
rather than weakened with concurrent market-level information shocks, which differs from
existing theories. I find that market-level attention is negatively associated with firm-level
attention and they have different effects on earnings pricing. Investors allocate their limited
attention accordingly between market-level and firm-level therefore investors have more muted
initial reactions to earnings announcements if they pay more attention to board market. On the
other hand, higher firm-level investor attention and concurrent important macro-news enhances
the immediate price reaction to a firm’s earnings surprise and alleviates the post-announcement
drift (PEAD).
In the second essay, I report evidence that good news is punished (rewarded) when
sentiment is bullish (bearish) and bad news is punished significantly more when sentiment is
bearish. My evidence suggests that investors do not overreact to good news when sentiment is
high (bullish) but overreact to bad news when sentiment is low (bearish). For the immediate
response, I find that the immediate price reaction to earnings news is weaker when sentiment is
bullish. For the drift, I find that the post-announcement drift is stronger following bullish sentiment.
I employ direct measures of firm-level attention and sentiment to explore the joint effect
of attention and sentiment on earnings pricing. I find that good news is rewarded more with high
attention no matter whether sentiment is bullish or bearish, whereas the effect of attention is more
pronounced when sentiment is bearish. The evidence also suggests that bad news is considerably
punished with high attention when sentiment is bearish. For the immediate response, I find that
the immediate price reaction is strengthened with high attention no matter whether sentiment is
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bullish or bearish, whereas the effect of attention is more pronounced when sentiment is bearish.
For the drift, I find that the post-announcement drift is weaker with high attention following bullish
sentiment. It is worth noting that good news with bearish sentiment and high attention has both
stronger immediate response and post-announcement drift. Existing literature, however, suggests
that high investor attention is associated with stronger immediate price reactions and weaker post
announcement price drifts to firms’ earnings announcements. Thus, my findings reflect the joint
effect of attention and sentiment and provide new evidence that investor attention and sentiment
do jointly affect the source of excess returns documented in the prior earnings-based market
anomaly literature.
In conclusion, this dissertation suggests that employment of big data in construction of
direct measures of attention and sentiment is a promising addition to this line for future research.
The findings further our understanding of the influence of investor behavior and belief on assets
(mis)pricing.
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Table 1 Variable definitions and sources
Variable
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆

𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁

𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆

Definition
The difference between the message volume of stock i on day t and its
average message volume over a 45-day window prior to 2 weeks before
day t (t-60, t-15) scaled by the average.
The difference between the message volume of board market on day t
and the average message volume from day t-60 to day t-15, scaled by
the average.
The difference between the announced actual EPS and the median of
the most recent forecast, divided by the stock price at the end of the
corresponding quarter.
Dummy is equal to 1 if a day is an announcement day for one of the
important macroeconomic announcements (i.e., FOMC, GDP, ISM
PMI, nonfarm payroll, initial jobless claims and CPI).
CARs are calculated using the market model parameters estimated over
the period between 300 and 46 days prior to the earnings announcement
and adjusted by the CRSP value-weighted index return.
The book value of equity divided by the market value of equity in the
year prior the earnings announcement.

Source
StockTwits

StockTwits

I/B/E/S
Bloomberg
CRSP
Compustat

The market capitalization in the year prior the earnings announcement.

Compustat

The natural logarithm of number of earnings announcements on day t.
Earnings announcements made during after-hours or holidays are
counted in the following trading day.

I/B/E/S

The natural logarithm of number of macro-news announcements on day
t.

Bloomberg

The stock’s abnormal turnover calculated as the stock’s daily turnover
on day t divided by the average turnover from day t-252 to day t-15.

CRSP

The natural logarithm of Amihud (2002) illiquidity which is measured
as the average ratio of the absolute daily return to the daily dollar trading
volume over the period from day t-252 to day t-15.

CRSP

The natural logarithm of 1+ the number of analysts covering the stock
using the most recent information.

I/B/E/S

The percentage of shares outstanding held by institutional investors.
The stock’s abnormal trading volume calculated as the stock’s daily
volume on day t divided by the average trading volume from day t-252
to day t-15.
The standard deviation of daily stock returns from day t-60 to day t-15.

WRDS
Thomson
Reuters (13f)
CRSP
CRSP
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Table 2 Summary statistics of key variables
This table reports summary statistics: abnormal attention(AbAtt), abnormal market attention(AbMktAtt),
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), standardized unexpected earnings (SUE), book-to-market ratio (BM),
firms size (Size), abnormal turnover (AbTurnover) as well as the number of earnings announcements per
day (#EA), the number of macroeconomic announcements (#MA), the number of analysts following the
firm (#Analyst), the logarithm of Amihud (2002) illiquidity (ILLIQ), the standard deviation of daily stock
returns (SDRet), the percentage of shares held by institutional investors (InstOwn), abnormal trading
volume (AbVol), daily sentiment score (DSS) and market daily sentiment score (MktDSS). See Appendix
A for detailed definitions of the variables. The sample includes stocks that are traded on the NYSE and
NASDAQ over the period of 2013-2018. All variables are except the log transformed variables winsorized
at 1% and 99% level.
Count

Mean

SD

P25

P50

P75

AbAtt

48669

16.91

39.03

4.05

9.31

18.93

AbMktAtt

48669

0.41

0.52

0.06

0.28

0.61

SUE

48669

-0.09

15.13

-0.08

0.04

0.21

# MA

47588

7.89

4.51

4

8

11

# EA

48669

171.48

111.98

82

162

254

# Analyst

48669

9.10

7.44

4

7

13

ILLIQ

45544

-6.46

2.42

-8.25

-6.55

-4.81

BM

47268

0.50

14.26

0.21

0.40

0.66

Size

47270

8605.24

30311.09

407.83

1363.41

4765.55

InstOwn

35837

0.70

0.28

0.59

0.78

0.90

SDRet

48669

0.02

0.015

0.013

0.018

0.026

AbTurnover

46394

2.89

9.08

1.33

2.08

3.33

AbVol

46394

2.93

9.18

1.36

2.11

3.38

CAR[0,1]%

48669

0.08

9.05

-3.96

0.03

4.03

CAR[2,75]%

48655

-0.38

24.61

-11.01

-0.49

10.21

CAR[2,90]%

48655

-0.18

27.69

-11.95

-0.26

11.59

CAR[-202,-3]%

48669

-1.10

30.03

-11.61

-0.60

10.37

DSS

48669

0.07

0.18

0.00

0.06

0.17

MktDSS

48669

0.015

0.03

-0.007

0.015

0.03
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Figure 1 Firm-level abnormal attention by day of week
Abnormal attention on each day of week is calculated as the mean (median) AbAtt of all firm-days on that day of week. The detailed
numbers in this figure are presented in Table 2 Panel A.

Firm-level abnormal attention on weekdays with versus without earnings announcements
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Figure 2 Firm-level abnormal attention on weekdays with vs. without earnings announcements
This figure plots the mean (median) AbAtt on weekdays with versus without earnings announcements. The detailed numbers in this
figure are presented in Table 2 Panel B.

Table 3 Firm-level abnormal attention patterns: day of week
This table summarizes the day of week patterns of all firm-level abnormal attention. Panel A presents the mean and median AbAtt and
total number of earnings announcements by day of week. Panel B compares the mean and median AbAtt with and without earnings
announcements for the same weekday. After close announcements are matched with attention on the following trading day. In testing
the differences in means, standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by date. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. t-statistics are reported in parenthesis.
Panel A: Mean and median all firm-level abnormal attention
Day of week

Sun.

Mon.

Tues.

Wed.

Thurs.

Fri.

Sat.

Mon. to Thurs.

Mean

-0.76

0.23

0.46

0.49

0.45

0.21

-0.78

0.41

Median
# of EA

-0.76
77

0.28
11517

0.44
19741

0.46
22843

0.44
28420

0.22
5692

-0.79
33

0.40

Panel B: Mean and median firm-level attention on weekdays with versus without earnings announcements
EA day

Day of week

Mon.

Tues.

Wed.

Thurs.

Fri.

Mon. to
Thurs.

Yes

Mean

0.28

0.48

0.51

0.47

0.24

0.44

No

Mean

-0.19

-0.15

-0.14

-0.35

-0.46

-0.20

Yes

Median

0.47***
(-5.58)
0.30

0.63***
(3.46)
0.45

0.65***
(4.94)
0.48

0.82***
(5.42)
0.45

0.70***
(7.76)
0.23

0.64***
(10.41)
0.42

No

Median

-0.10

-0.08

-0.10

-0.49

-0.37

-0.09

0.40***

0.53**

0.58***

0.94***

0.60***

0.51***

Diff (Yes-No)

Diff(Yes-No)

Diff (Fri.other
weekdays)
-0.20***
(-11.34)
-0.26**
(-2.41)

-0.19***
-0.28***

Diff (Fri.-other
weekdays)
-0.20***
(-10.11)
-0.18***
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Figure 3 Market-level abnormal attention by day of week
This figure plots the mean (median) AbMktAtt by day of week. The detailed numbers in this figure are presented in Table 3 Panel A.
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Figure 4 Market-level abnormal attention on weekdays with vs. without macro-news announcements
This figure plots the mean (median) AbMktAtt on weekdays with versus without macro-news announcements. The detailed numbers
in this figure are presented in Table 3 Panel B.

Table 4 Market-level abnormal attention patterns: day of week
This table summarizes the day of week patterns of market-level abnormal attention. Panel A presents the mean and median AbMktAtt and total number of macronews announcements by day of week. Panel B compares the mean and median AbMktAtt with and without macro-news announcements for the same weekday. In
testing the differences in means, standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by date. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
level, respectively. t-statistics are reported in parenthesis.
Panel A: Mean and median market-level abnormal attention
Day of week

Sun.

Mon.

Tues.

Wed.

Thurs.

Fri.

Sat.

Mon. to
Thurs.

Mean

-0.63

0.22

0.39

0.51

0.44

0.25

-0.78

0.39

Median

-0.68

0.12

0.29

0.37

0.33

0.16

-0.80

0.29

# of MA

0

849

1895

2590

2804

2028

2

Panel B: Mean and median on weekdays with versus without macro-news announcements
MA day

Day of week

Mon.

Tues.

Wed.

Thurs.

Fri.

Mon. to
Thurs.

Yes

Mean

0.32

0.40

0.52

0.47

0.28

0.44

No

Mean

-0.10

0.15

-0.83

-0.80

-0.05

-0.15

0.42***
(5.49)

0.25**
(2.01)

1.35***
(25.73)

1.27***
(36.61)

0.33***
(3.09)

0.59***
(9.96)

Diff (Yes-No)

Diff (Fri.other
weekdays)
-0.16***
(-4.33)
0.10
(-0.81)

Yes

Median

0.17

0.29

0.37

0.34

0.18

0.31

-0.13***

No

Median

-0.16

0.18

-0.88

-0.80

0.03

-0.19

0.22

0.33***

0.11

1.25*

1.14***

0.15***

0.50***

Diff(Yes-No)

Diff (Fri.other
weekdays)
-0.14***
(-4.09)
-0.13***
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Figure 5 Firm-level abnormal attention by month of year
This figure plots the mean (median) AbAtt by month of year. The detailed numbers in this figure are presented in Table 4 Panel A.

Firm-level abnormal attention with versus without earnings announcements by month of year
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Figure 6 Firm-level abnormal attention with vs. without earnings announcements by month of year
This figure plots the mean (median) AbAtt with vs. without earnings announcements by month of year. The detailed numbers in this
figure are presented in Table 4 Panel B.

Table 5 Firm-level abnormal attention patterns: month of year
This table summarizes the month of year patterns of all firm-level abnormal attention. Panel A presents the mean and median AbAtt and total number of earnings
announcements by each month of year. Panel B compares the mean AbAtt with and without earnings announcements by each month of year. After close
announcements are matched with attention on the following trading day. In testing the differences in means, standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and
clustered by date. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. t-statistics are reported in parenthesis.
Panel A: Mean and median firm-level abnormal attention by month of year
Month of Jan.
Feb.
Mar.
Apr.
May
June
July
year

Aug.

Sept.

Oct.

Nov.

Dec.

Mean

0.17

0.15

-0.01

0.01

0.04

-0.03

0.08

0.12

-0.03

0.14

0.01

-0.14

Median

0.39

0.41

0.21

0.18

0.25

0.20

0.26

0.28

0.17

0.33

0.19

0.03

# of EA

4592

11745

5477

8096

13071

1126

8699

12303

1069

8933

12076

1132

Panel B: Mean firm-level abnormal attention with versus without earnings announcements by month of year
EA day
Jan.
Feb.
Mar.
Apr.
May
June
July
Aug.
Sept.
Oct.

Nov.

Dec.

Yes

0.62

0.51

0.31

0.34

0.38

0.29

0.48

0.47

0.30

0.50

0.35

0.20

No

-0.64

-0.74

-0.78

-0.77

-0.80

-0.75

-0.71

-0.77

-0.72

-0.64

-0.76

-0.62

Diff(YesNo)

1.26***
(25.54)

1.25***
(37.37)

1.09***
(46.88)

1.11***
(40.84)

1.18***
(43.29)

1.04***
(31.98)

1.19***
(29.42)

1.24***
(51.11)

1.02***
(24.41)

1.14***
(22.62)

1.11***
(27.96)

0.82***
(18.09)

Diff
(Summer
-other
months)
0.07*
(1.9)
0.05**

Diff
(Summer
-other
months)
0.10**
(4.58)
-0.02
(-1.27)
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Figure 7 Market-level abnormal attention by month of year
This figure plots the mean (median) AbMktAtt by month of year. The detailed numbers in this figure are presented in Table 5 Panel A.

Market-level abnormal attention with versus without macro-news announcements by month of year
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Figure 8 Market-level abnormal attention with vs. without macro-news announcements by month of year
This figure plots the mean (median) AbMktAtt with vs. without macro-news announcements by month of year. The detailed numbers
in this figure are presented in Table 5 Panel B.

Table 6 Market-level abnormal attention patterns: month of year
This table summarizes the month of year patterns of market-level abnormal attention. Panel A presents the mean and median AbMktAtt and total number of macronews announcements by each month of year. Panel B compares the mean AbMktAtt with and without macro-news announcements by each month of year. In
testing the differences in means, standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by date. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
level, respectively. t-statistics are reported in parenthesis.
Panel A: Mean and median market-level abnormal attention by month of year
Month of Jan.
Feb.
Mar.
Apr.
May
June
July
year

Aug.

Sept.

Oct.

Nov.

Dec.

Mean

0.25

0.29

-0.02

0.11

-0.09

-0.00

-0.04

0.18

0.00

0.15

-0.07

-0.06

Median

0.24

0.32

0.07

0.21

0.00

0.04

0.01

0.08

0.09

0.04

-0.07

-0.14

# of MA

837

829

899

818

878

852

811

874

847

817

846

860

Diff
(Summerother
months)
0.01
(0.33)
-0.02

Panel B: Mean market-level abnormal attention with versus without macro-news announcements by month of year
MA day

Jan.

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.

May

June

July

Aug.

Sept.

Oct.

Nov.

Dec.

Yes

0.71

0.74

0.30

0.45

0.23

0.32

0.28

0.54

0.33

0.49

0.26

0.24

No

-0.52

-0.54

-0.63

-0.60

-0.69

-0.60

-0.65

-0.55

-0.62

-0.54

-0.66

-0.62

Diff(YesNo)

1.23***
(14.6)

1.28***
(15.39)

0.93***
(18.11)

1.05***
(16.18)

0.92***
(19.74)

0.92***
(13.72)

0.93***
(17.2)

1.09***
(12.47)

0.95***
(17.34)

1.03***
(12.22)

0.92***
(15.59)

0.86***
(13.98)

Diff
(Summerother
months)
0.01
(0.19)
0.00
(0.04)

Table 7 Investor attention allocation on earnings announcement days
The table presents the determinants of investor attention allocation on earnings announcement days. 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 is the
abnormal market-level attention on that day and 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 is a dummy variable equaling 1 if a day is an
announcement day for one of the important macroeconomic announcements (i.e., FOMC, GDP, ISM PMI, nonfarm
payroll, initial jobless claims and CPI). Control variables include 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁, 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁, 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 , 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 , 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ,
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 , 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 , 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 , 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 , 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 , and dummy variables for Friday and Summer. All
regressions control for year, month, weekday and 2-digit SIC sector fixed effects. Standard errors are adjusted for
heteroscedasticity and clustered by firm and day. t -statistics are reported below the coefficient estimates in parenthesis.
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨 as a dependent variable
Variables
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁

𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁

𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆

(1)

1.16 ***
(3.09)
-6.40***
(-27.43)
-0.72**
(-2.29)
-0.14
(-0.43)
-3.65***
(-8.66)
1.04**
(2.44)

𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆(× 100)
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼

𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶

Year fixed effect
Month fixed effect
Weekday fixed effect
Sector fixed effect
Observations
Adjusted 𝑅𝑅2

48.96***
(36.83)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
47559
0.026

(2)

(3)

0.46**
(2.08)
-3.68***
(-13.84)
5.77***
(4.04)
0.61
(0.82)
1.36***
(3.48)
1.65***
(3.89)
-1.65**
(-2.41)
6.10***
(4.13)
15.04***
(3.42)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
33123
0.34

0.65*
(1.68)
-4.44***
(-7.42)
-1.03***
(-2.63)
-0.76**
(-2.46)
-3.95***
(-7.63)
0.65
(1.40)
0.39**
(2.48)
-3.33***
(-11.95)
6.02***
(4.09)
0.66
(0.86)
1.42***
(3.59)
1.61***
(3.69)
-2.11***
(-3.16)
6.04***
(4.00)
38.49***
(5.67)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
32362
0.36
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Figure 9 Immediate price reaction to earnings news: CAR[0,1]
Figure 9 shows the mean CAR[0,1] against earnings surprise quintiles (SUE5: the most positive,
SUE1: the most negative) for the highest abnormal attention quintile ATT5 and the lowest
abnormal attention quintile ATT1.

The spread between SUE5 and SUE1 by the extreme abnormal attention
quintiles at different horizons
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Figure 10 The spread between the extreme earnings surprise quintiles by the extreme
abnormal attention quintiles at different horizons
Figure 10 shows the spread in average cumulative abnormal returns between the extreme earnings
surprise quintiles (SUE5-SUE1) by the extreme abnormal firm-level attention quintiles (ATT5 and
ATT1) at alternative horizons. X-axis is the event time window, and Y-axis is the spread in
average cumulative abnormal returns.

Table 8 CAR of earnings surprise quintiles by extreme abnormal firm-level attention
quintiles
I calculate the mean 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[0,1] and 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[2,75] across earnings surprise quintiles by the extreme
attention quintiles. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered by date. ∗, ∗∗,
∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. t-statistics are reported in
parenthesis.
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[0,1]

𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴5

9.30%

𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆4

4.17%

0.32%

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆3

0.97%

-0.26%

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆2

-2.99%

-1.14%

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1

-6.43%

-2.42%

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆5 − 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1

15.73%***
(27.80)
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴5
3.04%

3.26%***
(14.67)
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆4

0.26%

-2.74%

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆3

-0.80%

-4.21%

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆2

0.42%

-2.88%

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1

2.89%

-1.17%

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆5 − 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1

0.15%
(0.18)

2.71%**
(2.47)

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆5

𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[2,75]
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆5

0.84%

1.54%

𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴5 − 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1
8.46%***
(17.46)
3.85%***
(15.13)
1.23%***
(5.10)
-1.85%***
(-7.04)
-4.01%***
(-10.99)

𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴5 − 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1
1.50%
(1.39)
3.00%***
(3.49)
3.41%***
(5.47)
3.30%***
(4.47)
4.06%***
(3.77)

Table 9 Market reactions to earnings news: firm-level and market-level investor attention
This table reports the multivariate tests of the effect of firm-level and market-level investor
attention on the relation between 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[0,1], 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[2,75] and earnings surprises. The dependent
variable is indicated under each column heading. Control variables include 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 , 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ,
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁, 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆, and 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[−202, −3]. All regressions control for year, month, weekday and
2-digit SIC sector fixed effects. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered
by firm and day. t -statistics are reported below the coefficient estimates in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Variables
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆

𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼
Constant

Controls
Year fixed effect
Month fixed effect
Weekday fixed effect
Sector fixed effect
Observations
Adjusted 𝑅𝑅 2

𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[0,1]
(1)

-0.0014
(-1.34)
-0.0178***
(-23.47)
0.0073***
(28.74)
0.0022***
(3.14)
-0.0007***
(-2.98)
-0.0046**
(-2.35)
0.002***
(3.18)
-0.009***
(-2.95)
N
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
48640
0.12

(2)

𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[2,75]
(3)

(4)

-0.0012
(-1.19)
-0.018***
(-23.96)
0.0073***
(28.3)
0.0023***
(3.32)
-0.0007***
(-3.05)
-0.0042**
(-2.10)
0.002***
(2.97)
-0.0067*
(-1.65)
Y
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
45296
0.12

0.0072**
(2.17)
0.0105***
(4.73)
-0.0015**
(-2.25)
0.0016
(0.75)
0.0005
(0.74)
0.0094
(1.50)
-0.0034*
(-1.76)
-0.052***
(-4.77)
N
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
48626
0.002

0.006*
(1.77)
0.0103***
(4.84)
-0.0013**
(-2.03)
0.0032
(1.56)
0.0001
(0.19)
0.01*
(1.66)
-0.0039**
(-2.09)
-0.022
(-1.62)
Y
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
45282
0.04

Table 10 Volume reaction: firm-level and market-level investor attention
This table reports the concurrent correlation between investor attention and the stock trading
volume. The dependent variable is the abnormal trading volume 𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉. All regressions control
for year, month, weekday and 2-digit SIC sector fixed effects. Standard errors are adjusted for
heteroscedasticity and clustered by firm and day. t -statistics are reported below the coefficient
estimates in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨𝑨 as a dependent variable
Variables
𝐴𝐴𝑏𝑏𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴

𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴

(1)

(2)

0.077 ***
(4.26)
-0.028
(-0.55)
0.085
(0.75)
0.087
(0.69)

0.054***
(5.05)
0.073**
(2.02)
0.011
(0.26)
-0.088***
(-2.84)
0.32***
(7.62)
0.17
(1.22)
-0.31***
(-3.69)
-0.24***
(-7.67)
-0.26***
(-5.04)
1.46***
(3.16)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
33123
0.34

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆(× 100)
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼

𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶

Year fixed effect
Month fixed effect
Weekday fixed effect
Sector fixed effect
Observations
Adjusted 𝑅𝑅 2

1.58***
(5.03)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
46384
0.11

Table 11 Post-Announcement drift over alternative windows
This table reports the multivariate tests of the effect of firm-level and market-level investor
attention on the relation between CAR[2,90], CAR[2,105] and earnings surprises. The dependent
variable is indicated under each column heading. All regressions control for year, month, weekday
and 2-digit SIC sector fixed effects. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and
clustered by firm and day. t -statistics are reported below the coefficient estimates in parenthesis.
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Variables
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆

𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼
Constant

Controls
Year fixed effect
Month fixed effect
Weekday fixed effect
Sector fixed effect
Observations
Adjusted 𝑅𝑅 2

𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[2,90]
(1)

0.0084**
(2.22)
0.0122***
(4.84)
-0.0020***
(-2.62)
-0.0002
(-0.07)
0.0008
(1.02)
0.0109
(1.54)
-0.0039*
(-1.80)
-0.051***
(-4.08)
N
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
48626
0.0016

(2)

𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[2,105]
(3)

(4)

0.0073**
(2.00)
0.0124***
(5.24)
-0.0019**
(-2.57)
0.0016
(0.71)
0.0003
(0.44)
0.0119*
(1.78)
-0.0044**
(-2.14)
-0.014
(-0.91)
Y
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
45282
0.048

0.0103**
(2.46)
0.0133***
(4.78)
-0.0023***
(-2.75)
-0.0013
(-0.49)
0.0006
(0.70)
0.0129*
(1.65)
-0.0044*
(-1.84)
-0.0535***
(-3.85)
N
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
48626
0.0013

0.009**
(2.35)
0.0135***
(5.24)
-0.0022***
(-2.69)
0.0014
(0.54)
-0.0001
(-0.09)
0.0138*
(1.90)
-0.005**
(-2.19)
-0.01
(-0.64)
Y
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
45282
0.053

Table 12 Market reactions to earnings news: alternative measures of earnings surprise
quintiles
This table reports the multivariate tests of the effect of firm-level and market-level investor
attention on the relation between 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[0,1], 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[2,75] and earnings surprises by using alternative
measures of earnings surprise quintiles. The dependent variable is indicated under each column
heading. Control variables include 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿, 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁, 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆, and 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[−202, −3].
All regressions control for year, month, weekday and 2-digit SIC sector fixed effects. Standard
errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered by firm and day. t -statistics are reported
below the coefficient estimates in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% level, respectively.
Variables
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆

𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼
Constant

Controls
Year fixed effect
Month fixed effect
Weekday fixed effect
Sector fixed effect
Observations
Adjusted 𝑅𝑅 2

𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[0,1]
(1)

-0.001
(-1.11)
-0.019***
(-23.75)
0.007***
(29.20)
0.002***
(2.65)
-0.0005***
(-2.65)
-0.004**
(-2.00)
0.002***
(2.84)
-0.009***
(-2.85)
N
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
48640
0.11

(2)

𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[2,75]
(3)

(4)

-0.0005
(-0.50)
-0.019***
(-23.49)
0.007***
(29.12)
0.002***
(3.13)
-0.0006***
(-2.91)
-0.004*
(-1.66)
0.002***
(2.61)
-0.004
(-0.82)
Y
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
45296
0.12

0.005
(1.54)
0.01***
(4.20)
-0.001*
(-1.94)
0.003
(1.32)
-0.0000
(-0.04)
0.007
(0.95)
-0.002
(-1.15)
-0.047***
(-3.94)
N
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
48626
0.0016

0.004
(1.34)
0.01***
(4.27)
-0.001*
(-1.72)
0.005**
(2.08)
-0.0004
(-0.58)
0.008
(1.13)
-0.003
(-1.50)
-0.02
(-1.40)
Y
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
45282
0.041

Table 13 Firm-level investor sentiment on earnings announcement days
The table presents the determinants of investor sentiment on earnings announcement days. 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 is
the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index. 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 is the daily market sentiment
score extracted from StockTwits. 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 is the earnings surprise and 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 is investor attention.
Control variables include 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿, 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿, 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[−202, −3], and the dummy variable 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹. All
regressions control for year, month, weekday and 2-digit SIC sector fixed effects. Standard errors
are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered by firm and day. t -statistics are reported below
the coefficient estimates in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
level, respectively.
𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫 as a dependent variable
Variables
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴

𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶

𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹

(1)

(2)

0.21 ***
(46.80)
-0.02***
(-4.44)
0.015***
(3.32)
0.006***
(7.03)
-0.07***
(-4.44)

0.21***
(45.07)
-0.03***
(-6.38)
0.016***
(3.31)
0.005***
(5.93)
-0.06***
(-3.80)
0.08***
(22.84)
-0.07***
(-9.02)
0.08***
(3.02)
1.32***
(14.97)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
45296
0.06

𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿

𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[−202, −3]
Constant

Year fixed effect
Sector fixed effect
Weekday fixed effect
Month fixed effect
Observations
Adjusted 𝑅𝑅 2

1.87***
(22.31)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
48640
0.045
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Figure 11 Immediate price reaction to earnings news by the extreme sentiment quintiles
Figure 11 shows the mean CAR[0,1] against earnings surprise quintiles (SUE5: the most positive,
SUE1: the most negative) for the most bullish sentiment quintile DSS5 and the most bearish
sentiment quintile DSS1. The dash line plots the mean CAR[0,1] that is without the impact of
sentiment.

Table 14 CAR of earnings surprise quintiles by extreme firm-level sentiment quintiles
I calculate the mean 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[0,1] and 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[2,90] across earnings surprise quintiles by the extreme
sentiment quintiles. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered by date. ∗, ∗∗,
∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. t-statistics are reported in
parenthesis.
Panel A CAR[0,1]
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[0,1]

𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷5
3.94%

4.09%

2.98%

1.11%***
(2.70)

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆4

1.86%

2.93%

-0.80%

3.73%***
(11.15)

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆3

0.23%

1.83%

-3.37%

5.20%***
(22.66)

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆2

-1.74%

0.32%

-5.08%

5.40%***
(23.65)

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1

-3.81%

-0.51%

-8.45%

7.94%***
(26.47)

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆5 − 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1

7.75%***
(44.23)

4.60%***
(17.02)

11.43%***
(24.99)

𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[2,90]

𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷5

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆5

𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1

𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷5 − 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1

Panel B CAR[2,90]
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1

𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷5 − 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆5

2.50%

2.58%

4.10%

-1.52%
(-1.35)

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆4

-1.14%

-2.09%

-0.20%

-1.89%**
(-2.53)

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆3

-2.05%

-2.59%

-2.10%

-0.49%
(0.77)

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆2

-1.32%

-1.52%

-0.66%

-0.86%
(-1.07)

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1

1.10%

-0.98%

1.97%

-2.96%**
(-2.14)

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆5 − 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1

1.40%***
(2.69)

3.56%**
(2.55)

2.13%*
(1.81)

Table 15 The different effects of bullish and bearish sentiment on the immediate price
reaction to earnings news
The table tests whether the impact of sentiment on the immediate price reaction to earnings news
is different between bullish and bearish quintiles. All regressions control for year, month, weekday
and 2-digit SIC sector fixed effects. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and
clustered by firm and day. t -statistics are reported below the coefficient estimates in parenthesis.
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Variables

𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[0,1]

Controls

0.036***
(21.43)
-0.027***
(-21.42)
0.014***
(16.59)
-0.04***
(-30.14)
-0.015***
(-6.01)
0.002
(0.83)
0.029***
(6.98)
-0.023***
(-8.45)
0.005***
(10.91)
N

Year fixed effect

Yes

Sector fixed effect

Yes

Weekday fixed effect

Yes

Month fixed effect

Yes

Observations

48640

Adjusted 𝑅𝑅 2

0.12

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆5
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷5
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆5 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷5
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷5
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆5 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1
Constant

Table 16 The immediate price reactions to earnings news: firm-level and market-level
investor sentiment
This table reports the multivariate tests of the effect of firm-level and market-level investor sentiment on
the relation between CAR[0,1] and earnings surprises. Control variables include 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 , 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 ,
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[−202, −3], 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 , and 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆. All regressions control for year, month,
weekday and 2-digit SIC sector fixed effects. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and
clustered by firm and day. t -statistics are reported below the coefficient estimates in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪[𝟎𝟎, 𝟏𝟏] as a dependent variable
Variables

(2)

(3)

Controls

-0.02***
(-18.66)
N

0.027***
(29.40)
0.021***
(30.66)
-0.003***
(-14.68)
0.002***
(3.09)
-0.0005**
(-2.31)
-0.11***
(-41.91)
N

0.029***
(26.59)
0.021***
(25.69)
-0.003***
(-12.84)
0.002***
(3.06)
-0.0006**
(-2.28)
-0.11***
(-21.54)
Y

Year fixed effect

Yes

Yes

Yes

Sector fixed effect

Yes

Yes

Yes

Month fixed effect

Yes

Yes

Yes

Weekday fixed effect

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations

19449

48640

33123

Adjusted 𝑅𝑅2

0.15

0.12

0.16

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷5
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷5
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1

(1)
0.06***
(31.60)
0.016***
(6.75)
-0.06***
(-26.77)
-0.017***
(-5.04)
0.052***
(11.34)

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
Constant

The spread between SUE5 and SUE1 by the extreme sentiment quintiles at
different horizons
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Figure 111 The spread between the extreme earnings surprise quintiles by the extreme
sentiment quintiles at different horizons
Figure 12 shows the spread in average cumulative abnormal returns between the extreme earnings
surprise quintiles (SUE5-SUE1) by the extreme investor sentiment quintiles (DSS5 and DSS1)
over alternative windows. X-axis is the event time window, and Y-axis is the spread in average
cumulative abnormal returns.

Table 17 The different effects of bullish and bearish sentiment on PEAD
The table tests whether the impact of sentiment on PEAD is different between bullish and bearish
quintiles. All regressions control for year, month, weekday and 2-digit SIC sector fixed effects.
Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered by firm and day. t -statistics are
reported below the coefficient estimates in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% level, respectively.
𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪[𝟐𝟐, 𝟗𝟗𝟗𝟗] as a dependent variable
Variables
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆

𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[2,90]

Controls

0.010
(1.41)
-0.021*
(-1.68)
0.009
(1.07)
0.026*
(1.77)
0.012
(0.90)
0.011**
(2.22)
N

Year fixed effect

Yes

Sector fixed effect

Yes

Weekday fixed effect

Yes

Month fixed effect

Yes

Observations

19444

Adjusted 𝑅𝑅 2

0.0007

𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷5
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷5
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1
Constant

Mean CAR[0,1] against extreme surprise quintiles, sentiment quintiles and
attention quintiles
15.00%

10.00%

5.00%

0.00%

D5S5

D5S1

D1S5

D1S1

-5.00%

-10.00%

-15.00%
ATT5

ATT1

w/o ATT

Figure 112 Immediate price reaction to earnings news by extreme earnings surprise quintiles,
sentiment quintiles and attention quintiles: CAR[0,1]
Figure 13 shows the mean CAR[0,1] against the extreme earnings surprise quintiles (SUE5 and
SUE1) by the extreme investor sentiment quintiles (DSS5 and DSS1) under the impact of the
extreme investor attention quintiles. D5S5 indicates the most bullish sentiment and the most
positive SUE group and D5S1 indicates the most bullish sentiment and the most negative SUE
group. D1S5 indicates the most bearish sentiment and the most positive SUE group and D1S1
indicates the most bearish sentiment and the most negative SUE group. The dash line plots the
mean CAR[0,1] that is without the impact of attention.

Mean CAR[2,90] against extreme earnings surprise, sentiment and attention
quintiles
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Figure 113 Post-announcement drift by extreme earnings surprise quintiles, sentiment
quintiles and attention quintiles: CAR[2,90]
Figure 14 shows the mean CAR[2,90] against the extreme earnings surprise quintiles (SUE5 and
SUE1) by the extreme investor sentiment quintiles (DSS5 and DSS1) under the impact of the
extreme investor attention quintiles. D5S5 indicates the most bullish sentiment and the most
positive SUE group and D5S1 indicates the most bullish sentiment and the most negative SUE
group. D1S5 indicates the most bearish sentiment and the most positive SUE group and D1S1
indicates the most bearish sentiment and the most negative SUE group. The dash line plots the
mean CAR[2,90] that is without the impact of attention.

Table 18 The impact of attention on the spread (SUE5-SUE1) in average cumulative
abnormal returns by the extreme investor sentiment quintiles (DSS5 and DSS1)
D5S5 indicates the most bullish sentiment and the most positive SUE group and D5S1 indicates the most
bullish sentiment and the most negative SUE group. D1S5 indicates the most bearish sentiment and the
most positive SUE group and D1S1 indicates the most bearish sentiment and the most negative SUE group.
ATT5 (ATT1) is the highest (lowest) attention quintile and the second column presents the results without
the impact of attention. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered by date. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. t-statistics are reported in parenthesis.
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[0,1]

𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴

𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴5

𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1

𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴5 − 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1

𝐷𝐷5𝑆𝑆1

-0.51%

1.53%

-1.45%

2.98%***
(3.20)

𝐷𝐷5𝑆𝑆5 − 𝐷𝐷5𝑆𝑆1

4.60%***
(17.02)

6.56%***
(6.65)

3.10%***
(7.50)

𝐷𝐷1𝑆𝑆5

2.98%

9.21%

-1.66%

10.87%***
(10.56)

𝐷𝐷1𝑆𝑆1

-8.45%

-11.69%

-4.56%

-7.13%***
(-12.40)

𝐷𝐷1𝑆𝑆5 − 𝐷𝐷1𝑆𝑆1

11.43%***
(24.99)

20.90%***
(20.10)

2.90%***
(4.28)

𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[2,90]
𝐷𝐷5𝑆𝑆5

𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
2.58%

𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴5

𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1

𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴5 − 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1

𝐷𝐷5𝑆𝑆1

-0.98%

-0.12%

-1.53%

1.41%
(0.35)

𝐷𝐷5𝑆𝑆5 − 𝐷𝐷5𝑆𝑆1

3.56%**
(2.55)

2.28%
(0.65)

5.27%*
(1.75)

𝐷𝐷1𝑆𝑆5

4.10%

8.11%

2.41%

5.70%**
(2.06)

𝐷𝐷1𝑆𝑆1

1.97%

4.01%

-1.78%

5.79%**
(2.58)

𝐷𝐷1𝑆𝑆5 − 𝐷𝐷1𝑆𝑆1

2.13%*
(1.81)

4.10%**
(2.28)

4.19%
(1.34)

𝐷𝐷5𝑆𝑆5

4.09%

8.09%

2.16%

1.65%

3.74%

6.44%***
(12.90)

-1.58%
(-0.73)

Table 19 The different effects of high and low attention across both top and bottom sentiment and earnings
surprise quintiles: CAR[0,1]
The table tests the different effects of high and low attention across both top and bottom sentiment and earnings
surprise quintiles. All regressions control for year, month, weekday and 2-digit SIC sector fixed effects. Standard
errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered by firm and day. t -statistics are reported below the coefficient
estimates in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Variables
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆5
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷5
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1

𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴5
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆5 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷5
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷5
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆5 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆5 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷5 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴5
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆5 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴5
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷5 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴5
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴5
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆5 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷5 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆5 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷5 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1
Constant

Controls
Fixed effects
Observations
Adjusted 𝑅𝑅2

𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[0,1]
0.036***
(21.90)
-0.025***
(-19.65)
0.015***
(17.79)
-0.04***
(-30.82)
0.017***
(12.13)
-0.007***
(-9.10)
-0.014***
(-5.24)
0.005
(1.63)
0.018***
(3.98)
-0.017***
(-5.48)
0.024***
(4.78)
0.059***
(5.93)
-0.0004
(-0.04)
-0.054***
(-9.67)
-0.016***
(-4.37)
-0.025***
(-3.64)
-0.005
(-1.23)
0.042***
(9.85)
0.003***
(5.53)
N
Yes
48640
0.14

Table 20 The impact of attention on the in-quintile spread (SUE5-SUE1) for both bullish
and bearish sentiment quintiles
The table tests the impact of attention on the in-quintile spread (SUE5-SUE1) for both bullish and
bearish sentiment quintiles. All regressions control for year, month, weekday and 2-digit SIC
sector fixed effects. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered by firm and
day. t -statistics are reported below the coefficient estimates in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Variables

𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[0,1]

Controls

0.07***
(21.07)
0.016***
(4.58)
-0.07***
(-18.28)
0.021***
(6.36)
-0.04***
(-7.73)
0.015**
(2.16)
0.043***
(7.06)
0.087***
(8.02)
-0.03***
(-15.56)
N

Year fixed effect

Yes

Sector fixed effect

Yes

Weekday fixed effect

Yes

Month fixed effect

Yes

Observations

8855

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷5
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1

𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷5
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷5 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
Constant

Adjusted 𝑅𝑅

2

0.16

Table 21 The joint effect of investor sentiment and attention on the immediate price
reaction to earnings news
The table tests the joint effect of investor sentiment and attention on the immediate price reaction
to earnings news. Control variables include 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 , 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 , 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[−202, −3], 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ,
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 , and 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆. All regressions control for year, month, weekday and 2-digit SIC
sector fixed effects. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered by firm and
day. t -statistics are reported below the coefficient estimates in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪[𝟎𝟎, 𝟏𝟏] as a dependent variable
Variables
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷

𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
Constant

Controls
Year fixed effect
Sector fixed effect
Weekday fixed effect
Month fixed effect
Observations
Adjusted 𝑅𝑅 2

(1)

(2)

0.013***
(11.82)
0.02***
(29.67)
-0.015***
(-19.52)
-0.005***
(-18.61)
0.005***
(12.31)
0.0006***
(8.08)
0.003***
(3.70)
-0.0007***
(-3.41)
-0.07***
(-23.10)
N
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
48460
0.15

0.015***
(11.45)
0.02***
(25.22)
-0.015***
(-18.44)
-0.005***
(-17.25)
0.004***
(11.20)
0.0006***
(7.61)
0.003***
(3.67)
-0.0008***
(-3.29)
-0.07***
(-13.21)
Y
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
33123
0.19
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Figure 114 The mean CAR against the extreme sentiment and earnings surprise quintiles
with low attention (ATT1) at different horizons
Figure 15 plots the mean CAR against the extreme sentiment and earnings surprise quintiles with
low attention (ATT1) at different horizons. D5S5 indicates the most bullish sentiment and the most
positive SUE group and D5S1 indicates the most bullish sentiment and the most negative SUE
group. D1S5 indicates the most bearish sentiment and the most positive SUE group and D1S1
indicates the most bearish sentiment and the most negative SUE group. X-axis is the event time
window, and Y-axis is the average cumulative abnormal returns.
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Figure 115 The mean CAR against the extreme sentiment and earnings surprise quintiles
with high attention (ATT5) at different horizons
Figure 16 plots the mean CAR against the extreme sentiment and earnings surprise quintiles with
high attention (ATT5) at different horizons. D5S5 indicates the most bullish sentiment and the
most positive SUE group and D5S1 indicates the most bullish sentiment and the most negative
SUE group. D1S5 indicates the most bearish sentiment and the most positive SUE group and D1S1
indicates the most bearish sentiment and the most negative SUE group. X-axis is the event time
window, and Y-axis is the average cumulative abnormal returns.

Table 22 The different effects of high and low attention across both top and bottom sentiment and earnings
surprise quintiles: CAR[2,90]
The table tests the different effects of high and low attention across both top and bottom sentiment and earnings
surprise quintiles. All regressions control for year, month, weekday and 2-digit SIC sector fixed effects. Standard
errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered by firm and day. t -statistics are reported below the coefficient
estimates in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Variables
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆5
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷5
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1

𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴5
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆5 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷5
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷5
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆5 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆5 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷5 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴5
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆5 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴5
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷5 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴5
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴5
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆5 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷5 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆5 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷5 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆1 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴1
Constant

Controls
Fixed effects
Observations
Adjusted 𝑅𝑅2

𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[2,90]
0.035***
(7.46)
0.028***
(5.36)
-0.006**
(-1.99)
0.004
(1.20)
0.017***
(5.92)
-0.011***
(-2.66)
0.009
(0.96)
-0.013
(-0.87)
0.004
(0.27)
0.005
(0.54)
-0.02
(-1.15)
0.037**
(1.86)
-0.01
(-0.31)
0.002
(0.14)
0.026
(1.26)
0.008
(0.28)
0.003
(0.12)
-0.028
(-1.27)
-0.016***
(-9.01)
N
Yes
48626
0.005

The spread between SUE5 and SUE1 by the extreme sentiment and attention
quintiles at different horizons
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Figure 116 The spread (SUE5-SUE1) by the extreme sentiment (DSS5 and DSS1) and
attention (ATT5 and ATT1) quintiles at different horizons.
Figure 7 plots the spread in average cumulative abnormal returns between the extreme earnings
surprise quintiles (SUE5-SUE1) by the extreme sentiment (DSS5 and DSS1) and attention (ATT5
and ATT1) quintiles at different horizons. A5D5 indicates the highest attention and the most
bullish sentiment group and A5D1 indicates the highest attention and the most bearish sentiment
group. A1D5 indicates the lowest attention and the most bullish sentiment group and A1D1
indicates the lowest attention and the most bearish sentiment group. X-axis is the event time
window, and Y-axis is the spread in average cumulative abnormal returns.

Table 23 The spread (SUE5-SUE1) for both bullish and bearish sentiment quintiles with
different effects of high and low attention
The table tests the spread (SUE5-SUE1) for both bullish and bearish sentiment quintiles with
different effects of high and low attention. All regressions control for year, month, weekday and
2-digit SIC sector fixed effects. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered
by firm and day. t -statistics are reported below the coefficient estimates in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Variables

𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[2,90]

Controls

0.01
(1.04)
-0.023
(-1.12)
-0.003
(-0.27)
0.025***
(2.83)
0.04
(1.52)
0.01
(0.36)
-0.041*
(-1.67)
0.032
(1.04)
0.006
(0.62)
N

Year fixed effect

Yes

Sector fixed effect

Yes

Weekday fixed effect

Yes

Month fixed effect

Yes

Observations

8851

Adjusted 𝑅𝑅 2

0.002

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷5
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1

𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷5
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷5 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷1 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
Constant

Table 24 The joint effect of investor sentiment and attention on the post-announcement
drift
The table tests the joint effect of investor sentiment and attention on the post-announcement drift.
Control variables include 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 , 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 , 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶[−202, −3], 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 , 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 ,
and 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆. All regressions control for year, month, weekday and 2-digit SIC sector fixed effects.
Standard errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered by firm and day. t -statistics are
reported below the coefficient estimates in parenthesis. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% level, respectively.
𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪𝑪[𝟐𝟐, 𝟗𝟗𝟗𝟗] as a dependent variable
Variables
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷

𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 × 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 × 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀
Constant

Controls
Year fixed effect
Sector fixed effect
Weekday fixed effect
Month fixed effect
Observations
Adjusted 𝑅𝑅 2

(1)

(2)

0.004
(0.92)
-0.006**
(-2.41)
0.01***
(4.30)
0.001
(1.18)
-0.0006
(-0.56)
-0.0003
(-1.51)
-0.003
(-1.05)
0.0003
(0.41)
-0.02*
(-1.78)
N
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
48626
0.002

-0.006
(-1.25)
-0.003
(-1.13)
0.004*
(1.74)
0.0004
(0.41)
0.002
(1.58)
-0.0003*
(-1.67)
-0.004
(-1.54)
0.0006
(0.76)
0.41
(0.68)
Y
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
33110
0.034
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